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Do you know what I know? Investigating the depth of infants’ concept of belief 
Kimberly Burnside, Ph.D. 
Concordia University, 2019 
The main objective of the present dissertation was to investigate the depth of infants’ 
understanding of beliefs. Specifically, it was crucial to address the “rich” vs. “lean” debate of 
theory of mind understanding in infancy. The aim of Study 1 was to directly examine whether 
infants’ looking time pattern commonly observed in the VOE task was replicated when a 
mechanical toy crane replaced the human agent. Results revealed that infants in the incongruent 
group did look longer at test than the infants in the congruent group, thus suggesting that infants 
overattribute false beliefs to inanimate agents.   
 The goal of Study 2 was to examine whether infants’ looking time pattern in the VOE 
task was replicated using a switch agent paradigm. Specifically, infants watched as a true or false 
belief was attributed to an agent and then watched as a second, naïve agent search for the object 
at test. As in Study 1, infants in the incongruent group looked longer at test than the infants in the 
congruent group, indicating that infants formed expectations for this naïve agent’s actions, once 
again suggesting that infants overattribute beliefs.  
 Taken together, the findings from the two studies demonstrate that infants broadly 
overattribute beliefs to any agents, even those to whom adults would not attribute beliefs. These 
findings challenge the “rich” view of theory of mind understanding in infancy given that this 
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Theory of mind (ToM) is a complex socio-cognitive ability that is defined as the 
understanding that others have mental states, such as desires, intentions, knowledge, and beliefs, 
and that these mental states can differ from one’s own, such as false belief (Wellman, 2014). As 
such, it plays an essential role in human interactions, permitting the explanation and prediction of 
another person’s behavior. ToM was traditionally thought to emerge in the preschool years 
because early studies included tasks requiring verbal responses from the participants, thus 
limiting the ages at which it could be tested (Scott, 2017; Wellman & Liu, 2004). In order to test 
younger children whose verbal abilities are not as developed, researchers have designed implicit 
tasks using non-verbal procedures (e.g., anticipatory looking, violation-of-expectation (VOE)) 
(Clements & Perner, 1994). Using these implicit tasks, researchers were able to find evidence of 
ToM in infants as young as 7 months of age (Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010). However, it 
remains unclear whether these tasks measure a fully formed ToM or basic cognitive skills that 
are precursors to this ability (i.e., also known as the ToM in infancy debate). For example, 
despite many replication successes (see Scott & Baillargeon, 2017 and Baillargeon, Buttelmann, 
& Southgate, 2018 for reviews) most implicit tasks can be difficult to replicate, thus making the 
interpretation of their findings more challenging (Kulke, Johannsen, & Rakoczy, 2019; Kulke, 
Reiß, Krist, & Rakoczy, 2018).  
Although failures to replicate are often due to methodological changes, such as within-
subjects instead of between-subject designs (Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2016) or not enough time 
allotted to process the belief induction phase in the VOE task (Powell, Hobbs, Bardis, Carey, and 
Saxe, 2018), such instability could be interpreted as reflecting a fragile infant understanding of 
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false beliefs. Given the numerous studies with positive findings, many researchers have 
interpreted infants’ successful performances on these implicit tasks as reflecting a sophisticated 
understanding of ToM (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Scott, 2017). This view is labeled as 
mentalistic or “rich” because it argues that, once task demands are reduced, a deep and 
sophisticated understanding of ToM—an understanding similar to adults and older children—is 
revealed, implying that ToM is stable across the lifespan. However, there is a lack of consensus 
in the field as other researchers have adopted a “lean” view, stating that implicit tasks measure 
domain-general abilities, such as basic learning principles, rather than a complex socio-cognitive 
ability such as ToM (Heyes, 2014a; Ruffman, 2014). Given that there is evidence that supports 
both views, there is no clear consensus as to which model is the better one. Therefore, the main 
goal of the current series of two studies was to directly address the lean vs. rich debate of ToM 
development in infancy by attempting to determine: 1) whether implicit tasks elicit the same 
pattern of behavior from infants when an inanimate object (i.e., an agent that does not, by 
definition, hold beliefs) plays the role of agent, and 2) whether infants understand that beliefs are 
person-specific (i.e., non-transferable without an exchange of knowledge).  
Theory of Mind 
 Although ToM is defined as the understanding of others’ mental states, it is actually an 
umbrella term that covers several different sub-concepts (Wellman & Liu, 2004). For example, 
one can understand that someone else has a different desire than one’s own (e.g., a desire to eat 
broccoli rather than a chocolate chip cookie). Individuals can also have different goals (e.g., 
aspiring to become a psychologist vs. aspiring to become a mechanic). ToM can also encompass 
understanding others’ intentions (e.g., my intention when I listen to the radio is to anticipate 
traffic on my commute). Individuals may also have different beliefs about a situation (e.g., I 
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believe that my ice cream is in the freezer even though my roommate ate the entire pint). This 
last example is called “false belief.” Testing false belief understanding involves assessing 
whether individuals can perceive others’ unobservable mental states independent from their own; 
it is considered the “litmus test” for ToM understanding (Dennett, 1978; Wimmer & Perner, 
1983). A classic example of a false belief task designed to test children is the Sally-Anne task 
(Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). In this task, Sally puts her marble inside a basket before 
she leaves to go to take a walk. While Sally is gone, Anne takes the marble from Sally’s basket 
and puts it in a box. When Sally returns from her walk, participants are asked where they think 
she will look for her marble. To pass this task, participants need to respond that she will look in 
the basket as she is unaware of the change of location of her marble (i.e., she has a false belief 
about the location of the marble).  
 Traditionally, children were thought to understand false belief, with tasks like the Sally-
Anne task, between 4 and 5 years of age (Wellman & Liu, 2004). These tasks require children to 
produce an explicit response either verbally or by pointing to a given location. Therefore, these 
tasks are categorized as “explicit” false belief tasks. When assessed on these explicit tasks, 
children aged 3 years and younger typically fail to accurately predict the protagonist’s actions, 
and thus were initially thought not to have a fully developed false belief understanding 
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Repeated evidence of these failures on explicit tasks 
inspired researchers to modify task demands to determine if a more rudimentary false belief 
understanding was present in younger populations with immature executive function skills; these 
are termed “implicit” tasks.  
Implicit Tasks 
Clements and Perner (1994) were the first to use an implicit task to capture false belief 
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understanding in children whose ages ranged from 2 years 5 months to 4 years 6 months. In this 
study, children viewed pictures of two mice. One mouse placed cheese in a blue box and then 
fell asleep. The second mouse changed the location of the cheese and hid it in a red box. The first 
mouse then wakes up and expresses that he is hungry. Children are prompted by the statement “I 
wonder where he’s going to look?”. Following this prompt, children’s anticipatory looking (i.e., 
their eye-gaze) was measured to obtain an implicit measure of where they thought the 
protagonist would look for the cheese. They were also asked to explicitly report where they 
believed the mouse would search for the cheese so that the authors could compare the 
developmental progression of both implicit and explicit false belief understanding. Children aged 
2 years 11 months and older demonstrated an implicit false belief understanding (i.e., their gaze 
correctly anticipated where the mouse would look), whereas only children aged 3 years 8 months 
and older demonstrated an explicit false belief understanding (i.e., they were able to correctly 
state where the mouse would search). Therefore, it was concluded that false belief understanding 
develops earlier than previously believed and that this ability could be captured by spontaneous-
response tasks.  
Clements and Perner’s (1994) study sparked an increase in research on implicit false 
belief understanding in an attempt to determine how early this ability develops. These implicit 
tasks typically use eye-gaze to measure anticipatory looking or looking duration. In their seminal 
study using a VOE paradigm, Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) were able to show that infants as 
young as 15 months of age have an implicit false belief understanding. In the VOE paradigm, 
infants view a series of events, one of which is deemed surprising. The duration of infants’ 
looking at a scene is measured; it is expected that infants will look longer at a scene when they 
are surprised; that is, when their expectations are violated. In Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) 
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task, infants are familiarized to an actor repeatedly retrieving a toy placed in one of two boxes. 
Following this, a false belief is induced: when the actor is absent, infants see the toy move to the 
second box. When the actor returns, she either searches the empty box (i.e., congruent with her 
false belief) or the box containing the toy (i.e., incongruent with her false belief). Infants in the 
incongruent condition are expected to look longer at the scene compared to the infants in the 
congruent condition, showing that they are surprised because their expectation of the actor’s 
actions was violated. In this study, Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) used both an FB1 and an FB2 
condition. In the FB1 condition, the agent sees one change of location before exiting the scene, 
while in the FB2 condition, the agent does not see a change in location and therefore has a false 
belief that the object is in the box the agent placed it in. In both conditions, infants in the 
incongruent group looked longer at the scene than those in the congruent group. Furthermore, as 
a control, the researchers also assessed infants in two true belief conditions (i.e., the actor is 
present during the location change and therefore knows where the object is located). Again, 
infants in the incongruent group (i.e., empty box) looked longer than the infants in the congruent 
group (i.e., box containing the toy). This was a pioneering study as it demonstrated both true 
belief and false belief understanding in young infants. Since then, researchers have reported that 
infants as young as 7 months of age exhibit looking behavior consistent with false belief 
understanding (see Scott & Baillargeon, 2017 for a review). 
Since Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) seminal study, many researchers have found 
evidence of false belief understanding in infancy using various paradigms (e.g., Scott & 
Baillargeon, 2009; Song & Baillargeon, 2008; Surian & Geraci, 2012; Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 
2012). For example, using an anticipatory looking task, Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007) 
were able to provide evidence that 25-month-olds have an implicit false belief understanding. In 
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this task, infants viewed two familiarization trials during which an agent watches as a puppet 
places a ball in one of two boxes, after which the agent reaches for the ball. The purpose of these 
familiarization trials is to demonstrate that the agent’s intention is to retrieve the ball. Following 
familiarization, the agent gets distracted and fails to see that the ball is removed from the scene. 
When the agent returns, the infants’ anticipatory looks were measured to examine in which box 
they anticipated the agent to search for the ball—assessing the infant’s understanding of the 
agent’s false belief. In this task, the ball was absent from the scene to avoid biasing the infants’ 
looks to the actual location of the target object. Furthermore, the puppet, along with the ball, had 
exited from the middle of the scene to avoid biasing infants’ looks to either side of the scene. As 
such, the authors ensured that the infants’ eye movements would only be due to their anticipation 
of where the agent would look for the ball. The researchers found that 85% of the 25-month-olds 
correctly anticipated the protagonist’s actions. This study provided a rigorous test of false belief 
using infants’ anticipatory looking. 
Other researchers have pooled their efforts to demonstrate that infants have a false belief 
understanding when assessed using interactive tasks. Interactive tasks rely on infants’ elicited 
interventions rather than eye-gaze. As such, they are considered more explicit than implicit, but 
without the linguistic demands of traditional explicit tasks. For example, Buttelmann, Carpenter, 
and Tomasello (2009) used a helping task to demonstrate that 18-month-olds understood an 
agent’s false belief. In this task, an experimenter (E1) is sitting next to the infant while another 
experimenter (E2) explores two boxes. E2 leaves the room to fetch a toy. While E2 is gone, E1 
teaches the child how to lock and unlock the boxes. When E2 returns, s/he places an attractive 
toy in one of the boxes and then leaves the room again. While E2 is gone, E1 sneakily changes 
the location of the toy to “play a trick” on E2. When E2 returns, he attempts and fails to open the 
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box where he had last seen the toy and expresses puzzlement. If the infant helped E2 retrieve the 
toy from the other box, it reflected a demonstration of false belief understanding (i.e., the infant 
helped retrieve the object that they understood E2 wanted to retrieve, and understood that E2 
held a false belief about the location of the object). Southgate, Chevallier, and Csibra (2010) also 
used an interactive task to measure false belief understanding in 17-month-olds. In this task, 
infants were first familiarized with the set-up whereby the experimenter (E1) hid two familiar 
toys in two boxes, placed on each side of E1, and infants were then asked to retrieve each toy 
one at a time. Then, infants were introduced to two novel objects, which were also placed in each 
box. Following this, E1 left the room while announcing that she would return shortly. While E1 
was gone, a second experimenter (E2) entered and sneakily switched the objects’ locations to 
induce a false belief in E1, after which E2 left the room. Then E1 returned and asked the infants 
to hand her the “sefo” while pointing to one of the two boxes. For infants to demonstrate an 
understanding of false belief, they should infer that E1 wants what she believes is in the box (i.e., 
the object that was in that box before the switch). As such, for the infants to pass this task, they 
must fetch the object in the opposite box than the one E1 points to. These interactive tasks 
require more executive function skills than the spontaneous-response tasks based on eye-gaze, 
which explains why only older infants (e.g., 17-19 months) have shown successful performances.  
Replication Crisis 
Recently, spontaneous-response and interactive implicit false belief tasks have been 
shown to be difficult to replicate (Sabbagh & Paulus, 2018). For example, recent studies failed to 
replicate both Buttelmann and colleagues’ (2009) false belief task and Southgate and colleague’s 
(2010) “sefo” task (Crivello & Poulin-Dubois, 2018; Dörrenberg, Rakoczy, & Liszkowski, 
2018). The spontaneous-response false belief tasks have also been difficult to replicate. 
8 
 
Burnside, Ruel, Azar, and Poulin-Dubois (2018) used the autobox task with children and 
adults—two age groups who should excel at false belief tasks. The autobox task, developed by 
Thoermer, Sodian, Vuori, Perst, and Kristen (2012), is an anticipatory looking task in which an 
agent watches as a toy car moves from one garage to another—both located at the opposite ends 
of the screen. At the end of two familiarization trials, the agent reaches for the toy car, thus 
demonstrating a clear goal of retrieving the toy car. At the test trial, the agent gets distracted as 
the car is halfway to the second garage—while the agent is not looking, the car reverses and exits 
the scene on the side opposite of where it was heading when the agent was watching. Infants’ 
anticipatory looks are measured to determine whether, and where, they predict the agent will go 
to reach for the car. Burnside and colleagues’ (2018) goal was to attempt to generalize the 
infancy findings to older age groups—if false belief understanding in infancy is sophisticated 
and comparable to these age groups, than one would expect comparable performances. Only 
38% of children, and only 55% of the adults, correctly anticipated the agent’s actions (Burnside 
et al., 2018). Interestingly, despite the fact that their first look was often to the wrong location, 
adults spent significantly more time looking at the correct location, indicating that they were able 
to disengage their attention from the wrong location and redirect it to the correct location. This 
suggests that advanced executive functioning (i.e., inhibitory control) may be needed to succeed 
on this task. As such, this task may not reliably capture false belief understanding given that it 
heavily relies on executive functioning.  
Importantly, the original false belief task based on the VOE paradigm has also been 
proven to be difficult to replicate. For example, Dörrenberg and colleagues (2018), Powell and 
colleagues (2018), and Yott and Poulin-Dubois (2016) all failed to replicate the VOE task. 
Further, Kulke, von Duhn, Schneider, and Rakoczy (2018) attempted to replicate four different 
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false belief paradigms, including Southgate and colleagues’ (2007) anticipatory looking task, 
which they were unable to replicate. Additionally, recent studies have not found any convergent 
validity between the tasks that allegedly tap into the same ability (Dörrenberg et al., 2018; 
Poulin-Dubois & Yott, 2018). These (lack of) replication studies suggest that either 1) false 
belief understanding in infancy is not a robust phenomenon that cannot be reliably measured 
using implicit tasks, 2) the currently available tasks do not have adequate validity to measure this 
abstract construct (i.e., the non-replications can be due to methodological changes, thus 
indicating that the competence is fragile or unstable), or 3) these tasks tap into other abilities that 
are likely precursors to false belief understanding. Baillargeon and colleagues (2018) brought 
forward several explanations for these failed replications: making the events more ambiguous 
thus confusing the infants, changing the timing of events thus preventing the infants from having 
time to form expectations, changing the duration of the pauses during which infants’ looking is 
measured, and differences in populations studied, among other possible reasons. Therefore, it 
remains unclear whether implicit tasks have strong construct validity, which is why they are 
currently being investigated in the field in a large-scale replication study to clarify this issue 
(ManyBabies2; Frank, Tamnes, Reschke, Rocha-Hidalgo, & Lieberman, 2019).  
Interpretations of Implicit Tasks 
The most popular interpretation of infants’ behaviors in implicit tasks is that infants have 
a sophisticated false belief understanding, akin to older children and adults. Proponents of this 
“rich” mentalistic view of ToM understanding argue that infants and younger children fail the 
traditional, explicit ToM tasks simply because they are heavily reliant on language abilities and 
executive functions, rather than due to an undeveloped ToM (Baillargeon, Scott & Bian, 2016; 
Baillargeon et al., 2010; Scott, 2017; Carruthers, 2018). This may also explain the difficulty 
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involved in replicating performances on implicit false belief tasks that require executive 
functioning abilities (e.g., autobox task). This “processing-demands account” posits that, when 
children are asked the test question in explicit false belief tasks, they have to engage in (a) a 
“response-selection process” by analyzing the question and choosing to answer, (b) a “response-
inhibition process” by inhibiting themselves from answering that the object is in its current 
location, and (c) working memory processes in order to remember the story sequence and the 
protagonist’s false belief (Scott, 2017). Since infants’ spontaneous responses are measured (i.e., 
looking behavior), they do not have to “select” a response, or “inhibit” themselves from looking 
where the object is located (because, in most cases, the object is not located in the scene during 
the anticipatory looking period). In other words, their behavior reflects infants’ unsolicited 
expectation of the actor’s behavior, which thus reflects their understanding of the actor’s false 
belief. However, Wellman (2014) notes that it is unlikely that implicit tasks tap into 
“unvarnished theory-of-mind competence” and that the only reason preschoolers fail explicit 
tasks is because of immature executive functioning. As such, there is no consensus in the field of 
infant cognition on whether infants have an understanding of ToM and whether implicit tasks 
permit us to test this hypothesis effectively.  
Since the emergence of these findings, some researchers have opposed this view and 
argued that infants’ performance on implicit tasks reflect their understanding of simple 
behavioral rules (Perner & Ruffman, 2005; Ruffman, 2014). Specifically, Ruffman (2014) argues 
that stimulus-response behavioral rule understanding is rooted in advanced statistical learning 
abilities, which is an ability to learn patterns in behaviors (e.g., in the VOE task, the agent’s hand 
repeatedly goes where the object is located). Statistical learning, paired with biases towards 
facial features and motion, play an active role in directing infants’ attention towards agentive 
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behaviors (e.g., a person will look for an object where they last saw it; Perner, 2010; Ruffman, 
2014). Therefore, according to this “lean” account, infants’ performances on implicit false belief 
tasks is guided by behavioral rule understanding rather than mentalizing abilities (Low & Perner, 
2012; Ruffman, 2014). Understanding behavioral rules could be considered a precursor ability to 
understanding goals/intentions, which are early markers for ToM understanding. As such, this 
theory accounts for positive longitudinal findings using implicit false belief tasks. Other 
researchers argue that implicit tasks measure more domain-general abilities, which are—by 
definition—abilities that are generalizable to different situations (i.e., overall learning 
abilities). For example, Heyes (2014a) argues that infants’ behaviors in implicit tasks likely 
reflect their ability to detect low-level properties (e.g., colours, shapes, and movements) inherent 
in the tasks. She argues that in Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) VOE task, infants look longer 
during one of the two test events (i.e., the incongruent conditions) because of the perceptual 
novelty present in that test event. Specifically, prior to the test trial, infants see the toy move to 
the other box while the actor is absent (e.g., in the false belief green condition the toy moves to 
the yellow box). Heyes (2014a) argues that this action reduces the novelty of the yellow box test 
event because the previous movement was to the yellow box. As such, the green box test event is 
more novel than the yellow box test event, which would explain why the infants look longer 
during the green box test event. If this theory is true, implicit false belief tasks like the VOE task 
do not measure false belief, but infants’ ability to detect the perceptual novelty, or other low-
level properties, present in the test condition.  
Scott and Baillargeon (2014) have challenged Heyes’s (2014a) theory by citing extensive 
research demonstrating that infants do not only respond to colour, shape, and movement. For 
example, they argue that associative learning cannot explain infants’ understanding of identity 
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false belief. Specifically, Scott and Baillargeon (2014) state that Scott and Baillargeon’s (2009) 
findings are in contrast with this “lean” view. In one experiment, an agent demonstrated a clear 
goal of hiding a key in a 2-piece toy penguin that needed to be assembled by the agent. At test, 
the 2-piece penguin was previously assembled by another experimenter and therefore looked 
identical to the 1-piece penguin that was also present during the familiarization trials. The 1-
piece penguin was hidden under an opaque cover and the assembled 2-piece penguin was under a 
transparent cover. Infants looked longer when the agent reached for the penguin under the 
transparent cover because they were surprised that she reached for what she believed was the 1-
piece penguin (i.e., they expected her to reach for the penguin under the opaque cover to hide her 
key). In a second experiment, the agent’s goal of hiding the key was removed and everything 
else (e.g., colours, shapes, and movements) remained perceptually similar. Findings revealed that 
infants’ looking patterns differed (i.e., equal looking when the agent reached for the transparent 
or opaque covers) from the first experiment because they did not have any expectations for the 
agent’s actions in the absence of a clear goal. Scott and Baillargeon (2014) argue that these 
results are in contrast with Heyes’s (2014a) perceptual novelty account because despite yielding 
different looking time patterns, both experiments looked perceptually identical. If Scott and 
Baillargeon’s (2014) argument is correct, then the same argument should hold for the VOE task. 
In order to directly test the submentalizing hypothesis, Heyes (2014b) suggested replacing the 
human agent in the VOE task with an inanimate object, while keeping all other elements of the 
original task intact, to determine if infants are truly behaving based on low-level properties. 
Therefore, the goal of the first study in this dissertation is to test whether infants’ looking 
patterns change when an inanimate agent, which does not hold beliefs, replaces the human agent 
in the VOE task.  
13 
 
An alternative perspective is to question whether implicit false belief develops separately 
from explicit false belief. For example, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) proposed that implicit and 
explicit false belief tasks might be measuring two separate systems of overall ToM 
understanding (i.e., a two-systems theory). Specifically, they proposed an “efficient mindreading 
system [that] is evolutionarily and ontogenetically ancient, operates quickly, and is largely 
automatic and independent of central cognitive resources” (i.e., System 1; implicit), and a 
“flexible mindreading system [that] develops late, operates slowly, and makes substantial 
demands on executive control processes” (i.e., System 2; explicit) (Low, Apperly, Butterfill, & 
Rakoczy, 2016). According to this theory, and corroborated by mounting empirical studies, 
implicit false belief is thought to develop before explicit false belief. As such, implicit and 
explicit false belief are believed to develop separately, and in parallel, which would imply a 
dissociation when both these concepts are measured concurrently. Various studies report such a 
dissociation in 3- and 4-year-olds (Burnside, Azar, & Poulin-Dubois, 2017; Grosse Wiesmann, 
Friederici, Disla, Steinbeis, & Singer, 2018; Grosse Wiesmann, Friederici, Singer, & Steinbeis, 
2016; Low & Watts, 2013). These dissociations either provide support for the two-systems 
theory or indicate that the tasks used in infancy do not tap into ToM.  
In summary, there is a “lean” vs. “rich” debate about infants’ false belief understanding 
and there are results to support both sides of this debate (e.g., studies demonstrating sophisticated 
identity belief attribution and studies demonstrating a dissociation between implicit and explicit 
false belief understanding, supporting Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) two-systems theory). 
Given that a sophisticated false belief understanding involves understanding which agents should 
hold beliefs—as older children and adults do—this dissertation was designed to contribute to this 




The Present Studies 
The present set of studies was designed to answer the following research question: do 
implicit false belief tasks used in infancy truly measure a sophisticated understanding of false 
belief understanding? This question was answered with two studies. Study 1’s objective was to 
directly test Heyes’s (2014b) theory by replacing the actor in Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) 
VOE task with an inanimate agent. The inanimate object used would have as few animacy cues 
as possible (i.e., non-anthropomorphized) to avoid the generalization of false belief attribution. 
To conceptually-replicate the original study, a between-subjects design enabled a comparison 
between infants’ looking time in the false belief congruent group and infants’ looking time in the 
false belief incongruent group. If the pattern of infants’ performance on the modified VOE false 
belief task was the same as the pattern found by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) (i.e., longer 
looking at the incongruent condition), then it would indicate that infants overattribute beliefs to 
an inanimate object or that the task measures other abilities, such as perceptual novelty. In other 
words, if this task reflects infants’ sophisticated understanding of false belief, then they should 
not ascribe a false belief to an inanimate object. However, if the presence of an inanimate agent 
generates a different looking pattern, then infants failed to attribute a false belief to an inanimate 
object and perceptual novelty is unlikely to account for the results yielded in the VOE task. Thus, 
results from this study would contribute to the debate about the construct validity of the VOE 
task.  
Study 2 builds from the first study by examining in a more conservative way if infants 
truly understand which agents should hold beliefs. Specifically, a switch agent paradigm was 
used in the VOE task such that infants saw one agent in the familiarization trials and the belief 
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induction trial and then see a second agent in the test trial. This second agent was naïve as she 
never had visual access to the location of the object and therefore should not hold any beliefs 
about its location. Once more, if the looking time pattern found by Onishi and Baillargeon 
(2005) was replicated, then infants either overattributed beliefs to a naïve agent or the task does 
not measure false belief understanding. However, if a different pattern of looking is observed, 
then infants have the sophisticated understanding of which agent should hold a specific belief. 
As such, results from this study would further contribute to the “rich” vs. “lean” debate of ToM 
in infancy. 
Overall, results from this set of studies will provide an innovative approach by addressing 
the sophistication of infants’ false belief understanding when measured with the VOE paradigm. 
This is important because this task is often used to measure false belief understanding without 
questioning its construct validity. Further, this dissertation has theoretical value because the 
results from this set of studies will provide evidence for one side of the debate (i.e., the results 
will either be in line with the “rich”, mentalizing view, or with a lean view (e.g., submentalizing, 
two-systems theory)). This is also of importance because it will inform the field regarding 
whether ToM is a cognitive instinct (i.e., a specific ability unique to humans that is present from 
birth) or if it is learned throughout development (i.e., a cognitive gadget) (Heyes, 2018). 
Tomasello (2018) has recently brought forward an interesting alternative hypothesis in which he 
argued that implicit false belief tasks, like the VOE task, measure knowledge understanding, 
rather than belief understanding. He argues that infants are not yet able to differentiate subjective 
and objective perspectives and that this ability develops in childhood. This “shared 
intentionality” account posits that following the development of joint attention, children attend to 
social interactions and learn about their subjective perspectives. They then learn how to 
16 
 
coordinate their subjective perspectives with the objective perspective and that both of these 
perspectives can conflict with someone else’s perspective (e.g., the agent in the VOE task). Since 
these abilities only develop in childhood, Tomasello (2018) argues that false belief can only be 
fully-developed around age 4 or 5—the age when traditional explicit false belief tasks are 
succeeded. Therefore, in a series of two studies the goal of this dissertation was to determine 
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Infants Attribute False Belief to a Toy Crane 
The ability to understand and reason about one’s own and others’ mental states, also 
known as Theory of Mind (ToM), is a foundational cognitive ability (Wellman, 2017). Among 
mental states, false belief understanding—originally reported to develop around the age of 4 
years—is considered the marker of a fully developed ToM (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). A decade 
ago, this conceptual shift was challenged in a landmark study reporting false belief 
understanding in 15-month-old infants using the violation-of-expectation (VOE) paradigm 
(Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). This striking finding led to the conclusion that “infants already 
attribute false beliefs to agents, calling into question the conclusion that false-belief 
understanding is not achieved until about 4 years of age” (page 238) and that “false-belief 
understanding emerges early in life and is robust and sophisticated” (Scott & Baillargeon, 2017, 
page 246). This mentalistic account posits that this ability is masked by the high task demands of 
the standard false belief task, which requires well-developed executive functioning abilities and 
verbal skills (Baillargeon et al., 2010; Scott, 2017). Over the past decade, a large number of 
experiments have replicated and extended the original findings using a range of procedures all 
based on spontaneous responses, including anticipatory looking and prompted helping (see Scott 
& Baillargeon, 2017, for a review). However, a number of recent studies have failed to replicate 
the original VOE findings with human infants, calling into question the robustness of false belief 
understanding in infancy. Most studies conducted conceptual, rather than strict, replications as 
they incorporated minor or major procedural changes to the original design (Dörrenberg et al., 
2018; Poulin-Dubois, Polonia, & Yott, 2013; Powell et al., 2018; Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2016). 
Yet, the fact that methodological changes, such as the duration of infant-directed pauses or 
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within- vs between-subjects design, could impact the findings provides some evidence for the 
lack of robustness of false belief understanding in infancy as measured with this paradigm.  
Other paradigms have been developed to test false belief understanding in infancy (e.g., 
anticipatory looking, helping) but they have also proven difficult to replicate (Burnside et al., 
2018; Crivello & Poulin-Dubois, 2018; Priewasser, Rafetseder, Gargitter, & Perner, 2018; 
Schuwerk, Priewasser, Sodian, & Perner, 2018). Additionally, there appears to be a lack of 
convergence in performance when the same infants are administered pairs of nontraditional false 
belief tasks (e.g., anticipatory looking and VOE) (Dörrenberg et al., 2018; Poulin-Dubois & 
Yott, 2018; Powell et al., 2018). Finally, when adults are presented with false belief scenarios 
identical to those shown to infants in the VOE paradigm, they only refer to the protagonist’s 
mental states when instructed to do so, casting doubt on rich interpretations of infants’ 
mentalizing abilities (Low & Edwards, 2018). Nevertheless, it is important to note that some 
researchers have reported successful replications of the original results with the VOE paradigm 
(e.g., Kovács et al., 2010; Luo, 2011; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007; Träuble, Marinović, & 
Pauen, 2010; Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2012). Some of these conceptual replications included 
methodological changes to the original paradigm, such as replacing the human agent with 
animate agents (e.g., caterpillar, Smurf). In sum, there are mixed findings regarding the construct 
validity of this task.  
In contrast to the mentalistic account, leaner views have been proposed to explain the 
behaviors observed in procedures based on looking patterns or prompted actions (Ruffman, 
2014). For instance, it has been argued that infants’ responses in the VOE task can be explained 
by infants’ learning of stimulus-response behavioral rules, such as “people look for an object at 
the last place they saw it” (Ruffman & Perner, 2005). Another lean account suggests that infants 
20 
 
may solve implicit false belief tasks by submentalizing, a behavior that appears as if it is 
controlled by reasoning about mental states, but it is not (Heyes, 2014b). According to this view, 
rather than tracking the agent’s false belief, infants encode the shallow visual properties of the 
stimuli—such as colors, shapes, and movements—during the familiarization trials and respond to 
the novelty of their configurations at the test trial. Thus, infants look longer during the 
incongruent test event than during the congruent test event because they witness a more 
perceptually novel event than that in the congruent condition (Heyes, 2014a). In order to 
determine whether there is a rich false belief understanding that is stable from infancy to 
childhood, the sophistication of such reasoning must be further examined. To investigate this, 
one of Heyes’s (2014b) suggestion was to replace the agent with an inanimate object. 
Although anthropomorphism is observed even in adults in certain contexts, sophisticated 
psychological reasoning entails reserving mental states to humans and animals (Abell, Happé, & 
Frith, 2000; Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Oatley & Yuill, 1985). By preschool age, children 
deny mental states to inanimate agents (Opfer, 2002; Poulin-Dubois & Héroux, 1994). For 
example, Opfer (2002) asked 4-, 5-, 7-, 10-year-olds, and adults a series of questions after 
showing them an irregularly shaped dark dot moving in a goal-directed or non-goal-directed 
way. Specifically, the questions were addressing whether the participants ascribed biological, 
cognitive, and physiological properties to the inanimate agent. Although older children and 
adults considered the object as alive, even 5-year-old children did not attribute mental states 
(e.g., does it think?) to the inanimate agent (Opfer, 2002; Poulin-Dubois & Héroux, 1994). 
Interestingly, a number of studies have examined infants’ attribution of motivational states (e.g. 
goals) to goal-directed inanimate agents. A stimulus is considered agentive when it displays 
animacy cues (e.g., morphology, goal-directed action, internal control, etc.), while an agent is 
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considered sentient when it shows psychological reasoning abilities (e.g., think, remember). For 
example, by 5 or 6 months, infants attribute goals to a human but not to an inanimate agent such 
as a mechanical claw (Woodward, 1998). However, when unambiguous agency cues are 
provided (e.g., initiate motion in plain view), infants as young as 3 months detect the change of 
goals of inanimate agents such as a self-propelled box and can anticipate the goal of a 
mechanical claw by 11 months of age (Adam, Reitenbach, & Elsner, 2017; Luo & Baillargeon, 
2010). This type of evidence has been interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that there exists 
an innate specialized psychological reasoning system that is activated whenever infants process 
the actions of individuals.  
To our knowledge, only a handful of studies have been conducted on infants’ attribution 
of epistemic states to inanimate agents. Surian and Geraci (2012) used animated geometric 
shapes in anticipatory looking false and true belief tasks. Infants watched two familiarization 
trials where a triangle followed a disc in a Y-shaped tunnel and entered a box at the end of one of 
the tunnels. In the true belief test trial, once the disc entered a box at the end of the Y-shaped 
tunnel, it changed location while the triangle was present. The triangle then entered the tunnel 
and infants’ anticipatory looks to one of the two tunnel exits were recorded. In the false belief 
test trial, the triangle was absent from the scene during this change of location. Infants aged 17 
months, but not 11-month-olds, attributed both true and false belief to the triangle, that is, 
anticipated the disk to come out of the Y-shaped tunnel on the side that was consistent with the 
triangle’s “beliefs”. The authors concluded that by 17 months infants can attribute beliefs to a 
self-moving, interacting object lacking agent-like morphological features. More recently, Tauzin 
and Gergely (2018) showed that 13-month-olds attribute knowledge to geometric agents who 
displayed two agentive cues: goal-directed action and turn-taking, contingent communication. In 
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this task, a blob appeared to have the goal to find a ball hidden in one of two boxes—a second 
blob was also present throughout the sequence of events. During the task, a ball hid in one 
location unbeknownst to the first agent (i.e., naïve agent), while the second agent “knew” the 
location of the ball. They found that only when the agents engaged in unpredictable/variable 
contingent exchanges (i.e., communication), did the infants expect the naïve agent to find the 
object. Communicative contexts play an important role in ToM research. According to relevance 
theory, communicative utterances provide ostensive cues to observers (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). 
As such, results from Song and Baillargeon (2008) demonstrating that infants expect that an 
agent’s false belief would be corrected after being informed of the actual location of an object, as 
well as Tauzin and Gergely’s (2018) results indicating that infants recognized that animated 
agents can communicate information about the location of an object are in line with relevance 
theory and are in contrast with Heyes’s (2014a) lean view (Scott & Baillargeon, 2014). 
Therefore, communication is a crucial aspect in ToM understanding in the early years.  Finally, 
one recent study tested apes with a design in which the human agent was replaced with an 
inanimate agent to test false belief (i.e., moving geometric shape), and the pattern of anticipatory 
looking initially observed with a human agent was not replicated (Kano, Krupenye, Hirata, Call, 
& Tomasello, 2017). This was a follow-up to a previous study that reported that apes anticipated 
where a person would look for an object after the apes witnessed a change of location in her 
absence (Krupenye, Kano, Hirata, Call, & Tomasello, 2016). Given that apes only correctly 
anticipated the person’s actions it was concluded that submentalizing cannot be responsible for 
apes' anticipatory looks in a false belief task.   
The goal of the present study was to modify the design of the VOE task in order to shed 
additional light on the debate regarding the nature of infants’ false belief understanding. The aim 
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was to answer the question “does the VOE task measure mentalizing abilities or 
submentalizing?” The results are an extension of Santiesteban, Catmur, Hopkins, Bird, and 
Heyes’s (2014) findings, who addressed this question with the dot perspective task, but with 
Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) VOE task. To our knowledge, no study has investigated whether 
human infants’ responses in the VOE false belief paradigm are different when the agent is an 
inanimate object instead of a person. A remote-controlled mechanical crane performed the same 
movements as the human agent in the original false belief VOE task (Onishi & Baillargeon, 
2005). The crane lacked many predictive cues of agency, including human-like morphology 
(e.g., eyes, human-shaped body), biological motion, texture (e.g., skin, fur), as well as contingent 
interaction with another object. However, the exact replication of the original design required the 
toy crane to display other agency cues (goal-direction, self-propulsion). Although self-propulsion 
is insufficient to attribute agency, the perception of internal control tends to generate the 
attribution of agency, that is, an entity having goals (Baillargeon et al., 2016). Two experiments 
were conducted: 1) the original implicit paradigm with infant participants and 2) an explicit 
version of the same task with adults. If infants already have the sophisticated false belief 
understanding tapped by traditional false belief tasks, then they should not attribute a false belief 
to an inanimate agent. Specifically, they should expect the crane to behave at test as it had 
behaved in the familiarization trials—they should look longer at the event in which the crane 
moves to a different location than in the familiarization trials (i.e., congruent test event), similar 
to the looking pattern recently reported in apes with an anticipatory looking task (Krupenye et 
al., 2016). In contrast, if infants’ looking patterns from the original study are replicated when 
using an inanimate object, then this would provide evidence that infants might be mentalizing 
but are overattributing this mental state to all types of agents (i.e., sentient and non-sentient). 
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Such pattern of results could also signal that infants might be submentalizing when reacting to 
changes in the test events, creating associations between boxes, objects, and hands or shapes. 
Finally, if adults have a sophisticated false belief understanding and therefore understand that 
cranes do not have mental states, then they should anticipate that the crane will repeat the same 
movements as seen in the familiarization trials. In contrast, if adults attribute beliefs to inanimate 
agents, then they will predict that the crane will turn in a belief-congruent way such that they will 
anticipate the crane to turn to the empty box.  
Method 
Experiment 1 
Participants. Participants were comprised of fifty-three infants (29 boys and 24 girls, 
Mage = 16.51 months, range = 15.60 – 17.87 months). Each infant was randomly assigned to one 
of two conditions: congruent (n = 28) or incongruent (n = 25). Fourteen additional infants were 
tested and excluded from the analyses due to fussiness, preventing completion of the study (n = 
6), lack of attention during the procedure (n = 3), parental interference (n = 2), or experimental 
error (n = 3). Parents were asked to report if their child was previously exposed to a remote-
controlled toy at home or at daycare. Given that the toy crane was activated using a remote 
control, all infants with prior exposure to remote-controlled toys were excluded from further 
analyses (n = 17). Therefore, the final sample was comprised of 18 infants in the congruent 
group and 18 infants in the incongruent group. 
Procedure and materials. A warm-up session preceded the administration of the tasks to 
ensure that the infants were comfortable with the primary experimenter. During this time, parents 
were asked to complete a short demographic questionnaire, including a question about their 
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child’s exposure to remote-controlled toys. At the end of the session, infants received a gift and a 
certificate of merit for their participation. Parents received $20 as compensation.  
VOE false belief task. In order to conduct a strict replication of the original task, a detailed 
script of the task was approved by one of the original authors (Baillargeon, personal 
communication, October 9th, 2017). The task was administered on a stage-like apparatus (107 cm 
x 97 cm x 104 cm). A yellow box and a green box (14 cm x 14 cm x 14 cm each) were placed 37 
cm apart at each end of the stage. The boxes had a 14 cm x 14 cm opening on the side, covered 
with fabric. The boxes were placed such that the openings faced each other (see Figure 1). A 
yellow remote-controlled PlaymobilTM toy crane (77 cm x 32 cm x 32 cm) was positioned at the 
center of the stage, exactly in the middle of the two boxes. The crane’s arm extended 45 cm from 
the crane’s body. A white board (110 cm x 52 cm) was used in the belief induction trial to block 
the crane from the participants’ view. An orange cup (4.5 cm x 9 cm x 3 cm) covered in stickers 
with a magnet inside was used as the toy being manipulated by the crane. Another magnet was 
placed underneath the stage, such that the experimenter could slide the cup across the stage. A 
PanasonicTM camera was also located beneath the stage and was focused on the infant’s face, 
which was displayed on an LCD monitor. An iMac 2011 OSX Yosemite 10.10.5 was used to 
live-code infants’ looking behavior using the Habit 2000 program (University of Texas). 
Infants were seated on a highchair 110 cm from the stage. The parent sat 180 cm behind the 
infant. If infants refused to sit in the highchair, they were seated on their parent’s lap (congruent: 
n = 3, incongruent: n = 6) and parents were asked to wear a sleep mask to cover their eyes. 
Infants viewed three familiarization trials, one belief-induction trial, and one test trial. Each trial 
was followed by an infant-directed pause, which ended when the infants either 1) looked away 
from the scene for 2 consecutive seconds after looking at it for a minimum of 2 cumulative 
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seconds, or 2) looked at the scene for 30 cumulative seconds. Between each trial, an attention 
getter sound accompanied the rising and lowering of the screen. 
In the first familiarization trial, lasting a maximum of 12 seconds, the screen was raised, 
revealing a crane positioned between two boxes (a yellow box and a green box) and a small cup 
hanging from the crane’s hook. The crane’s arm moved slightly from side-to-side for 8 seconds, 
to mimic playing with the toy. The crane then rotated and placed the cup inside the green box. 
The crane paused in this position until the end of the infant-directed pause (Figure 1). In the 
second and third familiarization trials, lasting a maximum of 6 seconds each, the crane’s arm 
rotated towards the inside of the green box (i.e., where the cup was hidden) and paused in this 
position until the end of the infant-directed pause (Figure 2). The goal of these familiarization 
trials was to show that the crane, like the human actor in the original experiment, reached for the 
cup in the green box.  
In the false belief induction trial, lasting a maximum of 24 seconds, the screen was raised, 
revealing the crane oriented straight between the two boxes with a white board covering the 
lower portion of the crane. At the start of the trial, an experimenter hidden below the stage used a 
magnet to move the cup from the green box to the yellow box (Figure 3A). Following this, the 
upper half of the board was lifted, such that the crane disappeared from the scene. Using the 
magnet, the cup was then moved back into the green box (Figure 3B). This change of location is 
typically labelled as a false belief induction trial because the human agent in the original study 
held a false belief that the toy was in the yellow box. An infant-directed pause started once the 
cup entered the green box. 
Infants then viewed one of two test trials, lasting a maximum of 6 seconds (Figure 4). For 
the congruent group, the crane was rotated toward the yellow box (i.e., empty box). For the 
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incongruent group, the crane was rotated toward the green box (i.e., where the cup was located). 
For both conditions, the crane’s arm was paused in this position until the end of the infant-
directed pause. Infants’ total looking time (in seconds) at the scene during the infant-directed test 
pauses were recorded by another experimenter. If infants do not ascribe mental states to a crane, 
then they were expected to look longer at the test event that shows the crane moving toward the 
box that is different from the box where it went to during the familiarization trials (i.e., infants 
should look longer if they viewed the yellow box [belief-congruent] test event). Thus, unlike the 
case with the human agent, infants should not consider the change of location of the object 
during the induction phase as having an impact on the crane’s behavior during the test event. 
Three experimenters were needed to administer this task. One experimenter sat behind a wall 
(out of view of the infant), and activated the crane using a remote control and moved the cup 
with the magnet during the induction trial. A second experimenter, hidden by the puppet theatre 
wall (also out of view of the infant), raised the curtain at the start of the trials and lowered the 
curtain at the end of the trials. The third experimenter sat behind the puppet theatre wall at the 
computer and live-coded the infant’s looking time at the scene in order to transition to the next 
trial after the infant-directed pauses. During the entire administration of this task, no 
experimenter was visible from where the infant was sitting. 
Coding and reliability. Looking time during the infant-directed pauses was live-coded 
using Habit 2000 (University of Texas) as part of the procedure. To obtain a more precise 
measurement, infants’ looking time was recoded offline using INTERACT 8.0 (Mangold, 2010). 
To assess reliability, a second coder who was blind to the hypothesis of the study coded 25% of 





Participants. Thirty undergraduate students (11 males and 19 females, Mage = 24.49 
years, range = 20.08 – 35.67 years) were recruited to participate in a manipulation check of the 
procedure administered to the infants. They were asked to make predictions while watching a 
pre-recorded video of the VOE paradigm. Participants were undergraduate students enrolled in 
Psychology (13), Natural Sciences (9), Exercise Science (2), Engineering (2), Business/Finance 
(2), and Other (3) in a large Canadian University. 
Procedure and materials. Participants were asked to complete a short demographic 
questionnaire, including their field of study. Participants were entered in a draw to win one of 
two $20 prizes. The VOE false belief task viewed by the infant participants in Experiment 1 was 
filmed. Prior to watching the video, adults were instructed to carefully watch the short video and 
were told that they would answer two short questions after the video ended. Adults viewed the 
three familiarization trials and induction trial – the video ended when the curtain was lifted at the 
start of the test trial, revealing the crane centered between the two boxes. Participants were then 
asked to answer “do you think the crane will go to into the yellow box or the green box?” on a 
sheet and were asked to explain why.  
Results 
Experiment 1 
Using z-scores with cut-offs of ± 3.0, one participant’s response in the test trial of the 
congruent condition was identified as an outlier. This score was replaced with the next highest 
value within 3 standard deviations of the condition mean. In their review of how to analyze 
looking-time data, Csibra, Hernik, Mascaro, Tatone, and Lengyel (2016) suggested that raw 
looking-time scores should be transformed using the logarithmic formula. As such, all analyses 
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were conducted on transformed data, but the raw looking time is reported in text for comparison 
purposes. 
On average, infants in the congruent group looked at the scene for 6.48 seconds (SD = 
2.26) during the infant-directed pauses of the familiarization trials. During these same trials, 
infants in the incongruent group looked at the scene for 8.97 seconds (SD = 5.16). To determine 
if the two groups differed in their attention to the scene, infants’ looking time during the infant-
directed pauses of the three familiarization trials was analyzed in a 3 (trials) x 2 (group) repeated 
measures ANOVA. A main effect of trial was observed (F(2, 68) = 6.42, p = .003, η2 = .16), and 
there were no main effect of group or interaction. Post-hoc analyses revealed that infants looked 
longer during the first familiarization trial (M = 9.61 seconds, SD = 5.88) than during the second 
familiarization trial (M = 6.87seconds, SD = 4.50, t(35) = 2.57, p = .02, d = .52). Infants also 
looked longer during the first familiarization trial than after the third familiarization trial (M = 
6.70 seconds, SD = 1.13, t(35) = 2.44, p = .02, d = .46). Infants’ looking time after the second 
familiarization trial did not differ from their looking time after the third familiarization trial 
(t(35) = .14, p = .89, d = .03). Additionally, infants’ average looking time during the three 
familiarization trials did not differ between the congruent group and the incongruent group (t(34) 
= 1.47, p = .15, d = .63). Since the two groups’ performance did not differ during the 
familiarization trials, infants’ looking time during the test trial was compared between the two 
groups. The infants in the congruent group looked for 6.52 seconds (SD = 3.38) after the test 
trial, and infants in the incongruent group looked for 11.43 seconds (SD = 7.54) after the test trial 
(see Figure 5). The infants in the incongruent group looked longer than the infants in the 
congruent group (t(34) = 2.44, p = .02, d = .89). This longer looking indicates that the infants 
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were surprised when the crane turned to the green box (i.e., where the cup is actually located) 
compared to when the crane turned to the yellow box.  
Experiment 2 
Overall, 77% (23/30) of adults predicted that the crane would turn to the green box 
(binomial p = .005). When asked to justify their prediction, 61% of adults (14/23) said that the 
crane would turn to the green box because that was where the crane always turned in the 
familiarization trials. Six (26%) adults responded that the crane’s movements were linked to the 
cup’s current location and three (13%) adults provided other answers (e.g., “it didn’t see it go 
back to the green box”). 
Discussion 
The main goal of the present study was to investigate whether infants behave similarly 
when an inanimate object replaces a human agent in the false belief VOE task. It was expected 
that if infants possess a sophisticated psychological reasoning system, similar to that of older 
children and adults, they would behave differently across these two conditions and attribute false 
belief only to the human agents. Thus, they should not attribute a false belief to an inanimate 
agent, or display the same looking patterns as in the original task, given that the only animacy 
cue the toy crane displayed was goal-directedness—a cue that has been found to be sufficient to 
categorize an agent as alive, but not as sentient. Nevertheless, this distinction may be too 
sophisticated for infants. In the present study, infants behaved similarly as in the original 
experiment with a human agent. In contrast, adults’ testimony revealed that they expected the 
crane to turn to the green box given that this is the only movement the crane had previously 
exhibited. In other words, adults used a simple associative rule to predict the crane’s movements 
and did not expect it to be guided by a belief about the location of the object following the belief 
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induction phase. This is likely a result of their sophisticated false belief understanding and their 
advanced understanding of mechanical agents. However, it is important to acknowledge key 
methodological differences between the VOE task administered to the infants (i.e., implicit with 
a continuous variable) and to the adults (i.e., explicit with a dichotomous variable)—these two 
types of tasks do not have the same demands. Future studies should examine adults’ spontaneous 
looking behaviors on this modified VOE task and compare them to infants’ responses. To our 
knowledge, only one study has administered false belief tasks based on the VOE paradigm to 
adults (Low & Edwards, 2018). After being exposed to the agent’s actions, adults were either 
assigned to a mental-state tracking group (i.e., explain motives, beliefs, or perspectives), an 
object-tracking group (i.e., explain location), or a neutral group (i.e., explain events). Only the 
adults in the mind-tracking group provided explicit references to mental states. These results 
indicated that adults are not implicitly processing the VOE task as a mental-state task—it is only 
when they were instructed to do so that they referred to mental states in their narratives. It would 
be interesting for future research to replicate and extend this procedure by replacing the human 
agent with the mechanical crane. Further, Santiesteban and colleagues (2014) investigated 
adults’ mental state attribution with a Dot-Perspective Task. In this task, adults are asked to 
report how many dots they could see (self-task) and how many dots the avatar could see (other 
task). This task includes consistent (i.e., same number of dots visible to the participant and to the 
avatar) and inconsistent trials (i.e., the participant can see more dots than the avatar can). 
Santiesteban and colleagues (2014) compared a condition with a human avatar to a condition 
with an inanimate object (i.e., an arrow). Adults’ performance did not differ across the two 
conditions—adults were slower in the inconsistent trials. The authors suggested that the results 
yielded in such tasks might reflect submentalizing. However, a toy crane, unlike arrows, exhibits 
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an agentive feature (i.e., similar to the Heider and Simmel (1944) geometric figures). As such, 
the goal-directed action exhibited by the toy crane may explain why infants attributed mental 
states to this inanimate agent.  
The main contribution of the present study is to demonstrate that infants’ looking pattern 
in Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) VOE false belief task was replicated using an inanimate 
agent. The 16-month-old infants did not expect the crane to turn towards the green box as it had 
done in the familiarization trials and were surprised when the crane turned towards the new 
location of the toy cup in the test trial. These results are consistent with Surian and Geraci’s 
(2012) findings using an anticipatory looking task with animated geometrical shapes that showed 
agency cues of goal-directed and interactive behaviors. An important difference between our toy 
crane and Surian and Geraci’s (2012) blobs are that the crane displayed one animacy cue (goal-
directed action), while the blobs displayed goal-directed action and contingent communication 
with another agent. As previously mentioned, communication is an important aspect of ToM 
attribution and Surian and Geraci’s (2012) results, as well as Tauzin and Gergely’s (2018) 
findings, are in line with this relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). The VOE task in the 
present study did not involve such a communicative feature. There is evidence that infants reason 
about the actions of inanimate agents such as boxes and geometric shapes by attributing goals to 
such agents (Baillargeon et al., 2016). Such overattribution of motivational states has been 
previously reported in an experiment demonstrating that even 3-month-olds attribute goal-
directed actions to a self-propelled box (Luo & Baillargeon, 2010). 
One interpretation of the current results that is in line with the mentalistic interpretation is 
that infants attribute false belief to any object that displays agentive features—in the present 
case, an object that appears to be capable of autonomous movement and that acts in a “goal-
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directed” manner (Luo & Baillargeon, 2005). This interpretation is compatible with System 1 of 
Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) 2-system theory. System 1 is inflexible because it is “efficient, 
evolutionarily and ontogenetically ancient, operates quickly, and is largely automatic and 
independent of central cognitive resources” (Low et al., 2016, page 185). We argue that our 
results are in line with this inflexible system as infants automatically attribute mental states to all 
agents. It is only later, by preschool years that they employ the flexible system (i.e., System 2) 
and only attribute mental states to sentient agents (Low et al., 2016; Opfer, 2002; Poulin-Dubois 
& Héroux, 1994; Wellman et al., 2001). It has recently been proposed that key processes in 
constructing a flexible understanding of belief are social and mental coordination with other 
persons and their (sometimes conflicting) perspectives (Tomasello, 2018). False belief 
understanding requires engaging in social and mental coordination and involves shared 
intentionality (developed joint attention, linguistic communication) as well as well-developed 
executive functioning skills that permit such coordination. According to this shared intentionality 
account, in implicit tasks, infants are tracking simple epistemic states (e.g., knowledge). 
Knowledge attribution is a simpler ToM construct that is typically mastered earlier in infancy 
(Moll, Koring, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2006; Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Tomasello & Haberl, 
2003). Our findings are compatible with such a leaner mentalistic view but specify that infants 
are less selective than older children and track the epistemic states of all agents. One would 
expect that such rich social experiences would allow children to gradually narrow the scope of 
attribution of mental states to the animate agents with which they interact such as people, and 
animals. However, this account should be tested across the lifespan to investigate the context in 
which System 1 operates in adulthood, as well as the context when System 2 overrides System 1 
(e.g., Low & Edwards, 2008; Silva, Ten Hope, & Tucker, 2014 for methodological suggestions). 
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If there is developmental stability in false belief understanding (from implicit to explicit 
mentalizing) as some results from longitudinal studies have suggested (Thoermer et al., 2012; 
Sodian, Licata, Kristen‐Antonow, Paulus, Killen, & Woodward, 2016; but see Burnside, Azar, & 
Poulin-Dubois, 2018), then one would expect that infants would deny mental states to inanimate 
agents when tested with non-traditional false belief tasks based on spontaneous responses.  
Another interpretation that is also compatible with the current findings is the perceptual 
novelty account that posits that infants simply analyze the perceptual, shallow properties of the 
scene and compare these across the familiarization and test trials. According to this 
submentalizing account, the last time infants saw the crane (during the first part of the induction 
trial) it was associated with the object located in the yellow box, so the incongruent test event is 
the one that differed most from the last “crane event” encoded (Heyes, 2014a). Such a type of 
novelty effect most probably did not impact the reasoning of adults, as they instead used their 
conceptual knowledge and inferred that toys do not mentalize. Thus, they ignored the belief 
induction trial and used a simple rule, such as “the crane always turns to the green box”. 
Unfortunately, the design of the current study does not allow us to tease apart the various 
accounts that explain infants’ looking behaviors in the VOE paradigm. Therefore, the current 
results cannot clearly demonstrate whether infants operate with submentalizing abilities—more 
research is needed to determine which mechanism is underlying infants’ behaviors in the VOE 
task. The next step is to determine how infants interpret the crane (i.e., as an agent or as an 
inanimate object); results would help elucidate this issue.  
In order to control for experience with self-propelled inanimate agents, we selected 
infants with no exposure to any type of remote-controlled toys. Future research should directly 
compare infants with previous exposure to a remote-control toy to “naïve” infants. If a better 
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understanding of mechanical agents does in fact affect individuals’ performance, then one would 
expect a difference in performance between these two groups. Unfortunately, the current sample 
was not large enough to adequately compare and interpret these two groups’ performances. It 
would also be interesting to use a within-subject comparison where infants would be 
administered a task with a human agent and a task with an inanimate agent to directly investigate 
if the same infants behave differently across agents. We also recommend future research that 
would adopt the same design with other implicit tasks that are commonly used to assess false 
belief in infancy in order to determine whether the same patterns of results are replicated when 
using a nonhuman agent.  
To conclude, the purpose of the current study was to examine whether infants attribute 
beliefs to inanimate agents in the VOE paradigm given that most studies investigating false 
belief attribution to inanimate agents were conducted using the anticipatory looking task (e.g., 
Kano et al., 2017; Surian & Geraci, 2012); very few studies used looking time tasks (e.g., Tauzin 
& Gergely, 2018). These studies yielded conflicting findings. When the anticipatory looking 
paradigm was used with apes, they behaved differently when a geometric shape performed the 
actions in the change of location task, that is, they did not anticipate an arrow to act as knowing 
the new location of a displaced object. In contrast, by 17 months, infants attributed false belief to 
a simple animated shape. It is possible that adult apes may possess a different concept of false 
belief than human infants (see Heyes, 2017 for critical comments on the original findings) or that 
the anticipatory looking procedure is a more conservative test of false belief. More likely, the 
presence of contingent interactions between the stimuli in Surian and Geraci’s (2012) study 
might have been sufficient to trigger their psychological reasoning system. It is possible, as some 
researchers have suggested, that infants process the visual elements of the scene in the VOE task 
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rather than interpret the storyline with regards to the actors’ beliefs. If this is the case, then the 
properties of the agent are irrelevant as infants submentalize when exposed to such scenarios. In 
the present case, infants appear to be able to generate rapid, on-line predictions of agents’ actions 
toward objects based on their prior actions. Nonetheless, these submentalizing or 
“overmentalizing” abilities might provide the building blocks for the development of a 
sophisticated ToM. With the development of language and executive functions, paired with 
experience interacting with others, infants will gradually narrow down the concept of sentient 
agent. Some outstanding questions are: which mechanism underlies infants’ behaviors during 
implicit tasks (i.e.., overmentalizing, submentalizing, simple behavioral rules) and under what 
conditions (i.e., which agents) do infants display these behaviors?  Much remains to be done to 









     
Figure 1. Depiction of actions during the first familiarization trial, where the light grey box is the 
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Figure 3. Depiction of actions during the first location-change (A) and the second location-
change (B) of the false belief induction trial, equivalent to the FB-yellow condition in the 
original study (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). 
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Infants generalize beliefs across individuals 
The depth of infants’ theory of mind (ToM) is currently a subject of heated debate. For 
decades, researchers have attempted to determine exactly when this foundational socio-cognitive 
ability develops. Traditionally, ToM was thought to emerge between 3 and 5 years of age 
(Wellman et al., 2001; Wellman & Liu, 2004). Over the past decade, a large number of studies 
have challenged this view by providing evidence for early ToM understanding in infancy with 
tasks that have minimal processing demands (Clements & Perner, 1994; Gergely, Nádasdy, 
Csibra, & Bíró, 1995; Onishi and Baillargeon, 2005; Phillips & Wellman, 2005; Scott, 2017). 
These implicit tasks, which measure infants’ spontaneous looking or actions, provided further 
insight into precocious ToM in infants as young as 7 months of age. However, the interpretation 
of findings based on these implicit ToM tasks is currently the focus of an intense debate. One 
side of the debate (i.e., the rich, mentalistic view), founded on the numerous studies that 
demonstrate an early understanding of ToM, argues that it can be reliably measured using 
implicit tasks (Baillargeon et al., 2018; Baillargeon et al., 2016; Baillargeon et al., 2010; Scott & 
Baillargeon, 2017). Conversely, other researchers support leaner interpretations of infants’ 
behaviors measured by these tasks (Apperly, & Butterfill, 2009; Heyes, 2014a; Poulin-Dubois et 
al., 2018; Ruffman, 2014). Given the current relevance of this debate, the goal of the current 
study is to determine if the construct measured by implicit tasks corresponds to a fully-formed, 
sophisticated ToM understanding—equivalent to the ToM understanding found in preschoolers 
using explicit, elicited-response tasks as is suggested by the mentalistic view.  
ToM is defined as the understanding that others have mental states (Wellman, 2014). As 
such, it plays an essential role in human interactions—it is an ability that permits us to 
understand another person’s perspective and to behave accordingly. ToM is an umbrella term 
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that covers several different sub-concepts, such as desires, intentions, and beliefs that permit us 
to understand others’ mental states (Wellman & Liu, 2004). A fully formed understanding of 
beliefs requires mastery of true and false belief scenarios. A true belief is when an individual’s 
belief is congruent with the world. The most important milestone in the development of ToM is 
the understanding of false beliefs, as it assesses whether an individual can truly perceive others’ 
unobservable mental states independent from one’s own (Dennett, 1978; Perner, 1991). 
Understanding false beliefs implies the understanding that an agent’s beliefs about the world can 
be false (e.g., believing an object is in a location when in fact it is in another location). A classic 
false belief task is the Sally-Anne task, which measures whether children can answer where Sally 
will look for her marble after Anne changed the marble’s location without her knowing (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985). This explicit task requires a verbal response on the part of the participant. In 
contrast, implicit false belief tasks are often based on the same type of story line (e.g., a change 
of location), but instead of requesting overt responses to a verbal question, implicit tasks rely on 
the participant’s spontaneous looking behavior (e.g., time spent looking at the scene). In a 
landmark study, Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) used a violation-of-expectation (VOE) task to 
test belief understanding in 15-month-olds. VOE tasks assess whether infants look longer (i.e., 
find it surprising) when an agent acts in a way that is inconsistent with her beliefs. During a 
series of familiarization trials, infants saw an agent play with a toy and then place it inside a 
green box. In the belief-induction trial, the toy changed location (e.g., to a yellow box) with 
either the agent present, inducing a true belief, or absent, inducing a false belief. During the test 
trials, half of the infants saw the agent reach into the green box and the other half into the yellow 
box. If the infants expected the agent to search for her toy on the basis of her belief about its 
location (and not its actual location), then the infants should look longer when that expectation 
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was violated. Results revealed that infants were able to attribute both true and false beliefs to the 
agent. Thus, the authors concluded that “false-belief understanding provides evidence for a 
sophisticated (and possibly uniquely human) ability to consider the information available to an 
agent when interpreting and predicting the agent's actions—even if this information is inaccurate 
and incompatible with one's own” (Baillargeon et al., 2010, p. 110). According to that view 
infants and young children fail the traditional explicit ToM tasks because they are heavily based 
on language abilities and executive functions, rather than due to an undeveloped ToM 
(Baillargeon et al., 2010; Scott, 2017). This “processing-demands” account argues that, in 
explicit tasks, children must first select the correct response (response-selection process), inhibit 
the response of the actual location of the object (response-inhibition process), as well as 
remembering the agent’s false belief (working memory).  
 There are several proposals that posit leaner interpretations of behaviors observed with 
implicit ToM paradigms (see Krupenye & Call, 2019 for a brief summary). For example, 
Apperly and Butterfill (2009) argue that infants’ behaviors observed in implicit tasks might not 
be based on the same mechanisms as in older children and adults, but rather reflect a separate 
ToM system altogether that develops independently (i.e., Minimalist account). Specifically, it 
has been proposed that there is an “efficient mindreading system [that] is evolutionarily and 
ontogenetically ancient, operates quickly, and is largely automatic and independent of central 
cognitive resources” (i.e., System 1), and a “flexible mindreading system [that] develops late, 
operates slowly, and makes substantial demands on executive control processes” (i.e., System 2; 
Low et al., 2016). System 1 is analogous to implicit ToM whose function is to quickly track 
individuals’ mental states, whereas System 2 is analogous to explicit ToM whose function is to 
assess and process information leading to extrapolating individuals’ mental states. It is believed 
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that these two systems develop in parallel to one another, where System 1 develops early in 
infancy and remains functional into adulthood, while System 2 develops only in childhood. 
However, when measured concurrently, implicit and explicit false belief appear to be dissociated 
(Burnside et al., 2018; Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2016; Grosse Wiesmann et al., 2018). If this is 
the case, then infants’ looking behaviors in implicit tasks might measure a more primitive ability 
than what is believed to be a fully formed ToM understanding. On the other hand, researchers 
like Ruffman (2014) believe that infants’ responses in VOE tasks can be explained by the 
learning of simple behavioral rules (i.e., Behavioral Rule account). Whereby, infants rely on 
rules such as "people look for an object where they last saw it and not necessarily where the 
object actually is” (Perner & Ruffman, 2005, p. 215). This rule is known and applied based on 
behavior without any inference about mental states.  
Another lean view proposes that infants are solving implicit false belief tasks by 
submentalizing (Heyes, 2014b). Submentalizing is when individuals’ behaviors seem as though 
they are thinking about mental states but instead, their looking patterns are a result of the 
violation of the participants’ expectations of superficial associations created in the previous trials 
(i.e., perceptual novelty of the test trial). For example, in Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) VOE 
task, the last time that infants saw the agent in the scene, the object was paired with the yellow 
box (i.e., the association agent-yellow is made). At test, when infants see the agent reaching for 
the green box it violates the agent-yellow association made in the previous trial (Heyes, 2014a). 
In other words, infants are simply responding to the novelty of the configuration of colors, 
shapes and movements and are not attributing mental states to the agent. The hypothesis that 
infants might be submentalizing in the VOE task was recently examined—a human agent was 
replaced by an inanimate agent (i.e., a toy crane lacking morphological animacy cues such as 
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eyes; Burnside, Severdija, & Poulin-Dubois, 2019). Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) results with 
a human agent were replicated, suggesting that 16-month-old infants attributed a false belief to 
the inanimate agent. Adults, however, did not attribute a belief to the toy crane. Although a 
plausible explanation would be that infants responded to the novelty of the perceptual features of 
the scene (i.e., submentalizing), another plausible interpretation is that infants over attributed 
mental states too broadly (i.e., to a clearly non-sentient agent). Similar results were observed by 
Tauzin and Gergely (2018) who found that infants over-attributed mental states to blobs. 
However, proponents of the rich view argue that many of the lean views outlined above can be 
ruled out (see Baillargeon et al., 2018 as well as Scott and Baillargeon, 2014 for arguments 
against lean views). Needless to say, the lack of consensus has fueled a heated debate.  
If, in fact, infants are overattributing mental states to inanimate agents, then this would 
suggest that their false belief understanding is more rudimentary than the mentalistic account 
posits. It is recognized that a mature ToM involves understanding that mental states reside in 
individuals (i.e., person-specific; Wellman, 1990). Adults understand that thoughts are not 
transferred across individuals without some form of communication. Therefore, another way to 
assess the maturity or sophistication of infants’ ToM is to examine if infants also over-attribute 
beliefs to naïve agents, that is, agents who have not witnessed or been informed of an event. If 
infants overattribute beliefs, then their understanding of beliefs is not as sophisticated as that of 
older children and adults. This hypothesis has been tested in the case of simple, motivational 
mental states. Buresh and Woodward (2007) used a switch agent version of the visual 
habituation paradigm to test 13-month-olds’ ability to track goals. First, they familiarized infants 
with two actors who looked noticeably different. In the habituation trials, infants were shown an 
actor repeatedly playing with an object until the infant habituated to the scene. At test, infants in 
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the single-actor condition looked longer, as expected, in the new-goal trials (i.e., actor reached 
for a different object) than in the new-side trials (i.e., actor reaches for the same object as in the 
habituation trials). The infants in the switch-actor condition looked equally long during the new-
goal and new-side trials. This suggests that infants were able to understand that a goal belongs to 
a particular person and that this goal cannot be transferred to others (i.e., person-specific). 
Henderson and Woodward (2012) conducted a similar paradigm—they used a habituation 
paradigm with 9-month-old infants. In the training phase, infants viewed an event during which 
an experimenter demonstrated a clear preference for one of two novel objects. Then, the infants 
were administered a habituation phase during which the experimenter repeatedly referred to his 
or her preferred object. Finally, the infants were administered a phase during which the initial 
experimenter (Same Actor condition) or the new experimenter (Switch Actor condition) 
alternately picked the target object and the distractor object six times while consistently labelling 
the objects. The authors found that infants did not generalize object preference to the new 
experimenter, suggesting that 9-month-old infants understand that preferences are person-
specific (i.e., non-transferable).  
Kampis, Somogyi, Itakura and Király (2013) used a similar switch agent procedure to 
assess 10-month-old’s understanding of preference—referred to as “attitude”. In this paradigm, 
infants were either assigned to an “occlusion” group or to a “no-occlusion” group. First, infants 
were shown an agent (Agent A) and two objects placed in front of her, but behind translucent 
barriers. Infants in the no-occlusion group saw a hand remove one of the two objects. Following 
this, Agent A reached for the remaining object—because this object was the only available 
object for Agent A to take, no preference could be inferred. However, infants in the occlusion 
group saw a hand place an opaque barrier between the object and Agent A. Then, the hand 
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removed the object located behind this barrier—Agent A did not see the removal of this object 
and “thinks” that both objects are available. Following this, Agent A reached for the object that 
was not occluded—as such, it is assumed that this object is preferred because it is inferred that 
Agent A made a choice (i.e., her attitude towards this object). At test, both groups saw a different 
agent (i.e., Agent B) reach for one of the two objects—consistent or inconsistent with Agent A’s 
choice. Only the infants in the occlusion group looked longer when Agent B’s choice was 
inconsistent with Agent A’s choice. This implies that they were surprised that Agent B chose a 
different object from Agent A, suggesting that infants generalized Agent A’s preference to Agent 
B. Therefore, Kampis and colleagues (2013) provided some evidence showing that infants do not 
make person-specific preference attributions.  
The studies using the switch-agent paradigm all assessed infants’ understanding of 
motivational states, such as goals and preferences. However, to the best of our knowledge, none 
has examined if infants also treat epistemic states as person-specific. In other words, it is still 
unclear how infants would behave to a change of agent in a typical false belief paradigm. Given 
the ongoing debate about the depth of false belief understanding in infancy, it was crucial to 
investigate whether infants understand that beliefs are unique to individuals—a marker of a 
sophisticated ToM understanding. Therefore, the main goal of the present study was to determine 
whether infants generalize beliefs across individuals in the classic false belief task based on the 
VOE paradigm. Specifically, infants watched an agent interact with an object followed by a 
belief-induction trial that induced a true or false belief to this agent. At test, a naïve agent, never 
exposed to the location of the toy, reached in one of the two boxes. If infants have a sophisticated 
belief understanding, they should not form the expectation that the naïve agent possesses a belief, 
recognizing that beliefs require perceptual access to the object during the familiarization trials—
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and that such experience is not transferable across different individuals. If infants have no 
expectation about the naïve agent’s actions in the test trial, then those in the congruent group 
should look equally long as those in the incongruent group (here, the terms congruent and 
incongruent are based on the initial agent’s beliefs to keep consistent with the original study). 
Therefore, if infants have a sophisticated understanding of beliefs, then we expect no group 
differences in looking time. However, if infants’ looking patterns replicate those found in Onishi 
and Baillargeon’s (2005) study (i.e., longer looking in the incongruent group compared to the 
congruent group), then infants overattribute beliefs to naïve agents. Finally, as a manipulation 
check, a filmed version of this paradigm was shown to adult participants to confirm that adults 
would attribute ignorance to the naïve agent and predict a random search behavior. 
Method 
Participants 
True belief. The sample comprised 50 infants (27 boys and 23 girls, Mage = 16.80 
months, range = 15.43 – 17.99 months). Infants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions: congruent (n = 25) or incongruent (n = 25). Eight additional infants were tested and 
excluded from the analyses due to fussiness during the task administration. 
False belief. Participants were 54 infants (26 boys and 28 girls, Mage = 16.40 months, 
range = 15.20 – 17.80 months). Infants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: 
congruent (n = 27) or incongruent (n = 27). Five additional infants were tested and excluded 
from the analyses due to fussiness during the task administration.  
Adults. Thirty students (8 males and 22 females, Mage = 22.88 years, range = 18.83 – 
32.99 years) were recruited on a university campus in a large Canadian city. Participants were 
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students enrolled in Psychology (13), Natural Sciences (11), Business/Finance (4), and Exercise 
Science (2).  
Procedure and Materials 
This project received approval from the research ethics committee of The University 
Human Research Ethics committee. Prior to the testing period, infants were familiarized to the 
testing environment and the caregiver completed a short demographic questionnaire. At the end 
of the session, infants received a certificate of merit for their participation and a small gift. 
Infants’ caregivers were given $20 as compensation for their participation.  
The task was administered on a stage-like apparatus (107 cm x 97 cm x 104 cm). This 
apparatus has a back wall (107 cm x 97 cm) that is separated in four small doors (the right top 
and bottom doors: 56.5 cm x 43.5 cm and the left top and bottom doors: 55 cm x 43.5 cm). As in 
Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) design, these doors permit the agents to be out of sight of the 
infants when they are closed. A yellow box and a green box (14 cm x 14 cm x 14 cm each) were 
placed 37 cm apart at each end of the stage. The boxes had a 14 cm x 14 cm opening on the side, 
covered with fabric. The boxes were placed such that the openings faced each other. An orange 
cup (4.5 cm x 9 cm x 3 cm) covered in stickers with a magnet inside was used as the toy being 
manipulated by the agents. Another magnet was placed underneath the stage, such that it could 
slide across the stage. A PanasonicTM camera was positioned to focus on the infant’s face, which 
was displayed on an LCD monitor. An AppleTM G5 computer was used to live-code infants’ 
looking behavior using the Habit 2000 program (University of Texas). Infants were seated on a 
highchair 110 cm from the stage and their caregiver sat behind the infants. If infants refused to 
sit in the highchair, they sat on their caregiver’s lap (true belief: n = 9, false belief: n = 13). In 
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these cases, the caregivers wore a sleep mask over their eyes to avoid biasing the infants’ looking 
behavior. 
True belief. As in the original version of this task (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005), infants 
viewed three familiarization trials, one belief-induction trial, and one test trial. An additional trial 
was shown prior to the familiarization trials to introduce the two different agents (E1 and E2) to 
the infants (i.e. an exposure trial). One agent was dressed in white, wearing a white visor, glasses 
and had long hair and the other agent was dressed in black, wearing a black visor, no glasses and 
had her hair tied up. The color of the agents’ clothing as well as the role the agent played (E1 vs. 
E2) was counterbalanced, creating four pairings. In this exposure trial, both agents smiled and 
waved to the infant until the infant looked away for 2 consecutive seconds after looking at the 
scene for a minimum of 2 cumulative seconds. Infants could look up to 30 seconds in total. 
Given that the end of the trial was completely determined on the infant’s response, it is 
henceforth referred to as “infant-directed”. Between each trial, an attention-getting sound 
accompanied the rising and lowering of the screen. Infants’ looking was measured during the 
infant-directed pause that followed each trial, including the waving pre-trial. These trials ended 
when the infants 1) looked away from the scene for 2 consecutive seconds after looking at it for a 
minimum of 2 cumulative seconds, or 2) looked at the scene for 30 cumulative seconds.  
The first familiarization trial (12s) begins with the screen rising to reveal E1 sitting (at 
eye-level with the infants) behind two boxes (a yellow box and a green box) and a small cup 
placed on the table in between the two boxes. E1 raised her head for a brief moment to ensure 
that the infants recognized her. E1 then grabbed the toy cup in front of her and gently played 
with it for 8 seconds by passing it from hand to hand. After this, E1 placed the toy in the green 
box and remained in this position until the end of the infant-directed pause. In the second and 
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third familiarization trials (6s each), after the screen was raised E1 reached and placed her hand 
inside the green box (i.e., where the cup was hidden) and remained in this position until the end 
of the infant-directed pause. The goal of these familiarization trials was to show that E1’s goal is 
to obtain the cup in the green box. During these trials, E2 was raising and lowering the screen 
following the attention-getting sound.  
In the belief induction trial (8s), the two bottom doors behind the two boxes were closed 
such that E1 was now standing behind these doors watching the toy cup being moved from the 
green box to the yellow box. The toy cup changed location without the involvement of E1, who 
observed the change of location in this scene while E2 moved the toy cup using the magnet from 
under the stage. Once the toy cup was inside the yellow box, the infant-directed pause began, 
during which E1 kept her gaze on the yellow box (i.e., E1 has a true belief that the cup is located 
in the yellow box). Once this infant-directed pause ended and the curtain was lowered, E1 and 
E2 switched positions, such that E1 was now raising/lowering the curtain and E2 was the agent 
in the scene. When the test trial (6s) began, the curtain was raised to reveal E2 sitting behind the 
two boxes. E2 raised her head for a brief moment to ensure the infants noted the change of agent. 
Infants in the congruent group saw E2 reach in the yellow box (congruent with E1’s belief) and 
infants in the incongruent group saw E2 reach in the green box (incongruent with E1’s belief). 
E2 paused with her hand inside the box until the end of the infant-directed pause. The third 
experimenter live-coded the infant’s looking time at the scene in order to transition to the next 
trial after the infant-directed pauses. Infants’ total looking time (in seconds) at the scene during 
the infant-directed test pauses was recorded. The waving pre-trial and agent-switch in the test 
trial excluded, this paradigm is an exact replication of Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) VOE 
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task, which was approved by the original author (Baillargeon, personal communication, October 
9th, 2017). 
False belief. Infants in the false belief condition saw the same waving pre-trial and three 
familiarization trials as in the true belief condition. During the belief-induction trial (24s), infants 
also saw E1 watch as the toy cup moved to the yellow box. However, once the toy disappeared 
inside the yellow box, E1 closed the two upper white doors, thus disappearing from the scene. 
Following this, the toy cup moved back to the green box (i.e., E1 has a false belief that the toy 
cup is in the yellow box when it is actually located in the green box). The infant-directed pause 
started once the cup entered the green box. Again, once the screen was lowered at the end of the 
belief-induction trial, E1 and E2 switched positions. When the test trial (6s) began, the curtain 
was raised to reveal E2 positioned behind the two boxes. As in the true belief condition, E2 
raised her head for a brief moment then reached either in the yellow box (congruent condition) or 
in the green box (incongruent condition). Again, infants’ total looking time (in seconds) at the 
scene during the infant-directed test pauses was recorded by a third experimenter.  
Adults. Prior to viewing the pre-recorded video, participants completed a demographic 
questionnaire and were entered in a draw with the possibility of winning a $20 prize. The video 
consisted of the exposure trial, three familiarization trials and the induction trial of the false 
belief switch-agent condition. The video ended after the curtain was raised at the start of the test 
trial, showing the novel agent sitting behind both boxes. This scene was paused, and the adults 
were asked to answer “do you think the actor will search in the yellow box or the green box?”. 
Coding and Reliability  
For the VOE task, Habit 2000 was used to live-code the infants’ looking time during the 
infant-directed pauses. To obtain a more precise measurement, infants’ looking time was recoded 
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offline using INTERACT 8.0 (Mangold) by the primary experimenter. To assess reliability, a 
second coder who was blind to the hypothesis of the study coded 25% of the video recordings. 
Cohen’s kappa reliability was .85 for the false belief videos and .82 for the true belief videos.  
Results 
Using z-scores with cut-offs of ± 3.0, one participant’s response in the test trial of the 
congruent condition in the true belief condition and one in the test trial of the congruent 
condition in the false belief condition were identified as an outlier. These scores were replaced 
with the next highest value within 3 standard deviations of the congruent condition mean. 
Following this modification, the distribution of infants’ looking time at the screen during all 
trials was normally distributed.  
Manipulation Checks 
True belief. Firstly, analyses were conducted to make sure that the infants looked at both 
agents during the waving pre-trial. A 2 (side) X 4 (pairing) ANOVA was conducted to determine 
if the infants developed an agent/color preference during the waving pre-trial – the side variable 
refers to infants’ looking time to each side of the stage during this trial given that the position of 
the two agents was counterbalanced across infants. No main effect of side (F(1, 46) = .001, p = 
.98, η2 < .001) or pairing (F(3, 46) = 1.19, p = .33, η2 = .07) nor an interaction (F(3, 46) = .32, p 
= .81, η2 = .02) were found, indicating that infants looked equally to both agents across all four 
pairings. In other words, no agent, color, or side preference was found. Next, a 3 (familiarization 
trials) X 2 (group) ANOVA was used to analyze whether infants in the two groups differed in 
their pattern of looking during the familiarization trials. A significant main effect of trial was 
found (F(2, 96) = 47.71, p < .001, η2 = .50). No main effect of group (F(1, 48) = 2.28, p = .14, η2 
= .05) nor an interaction (F(2, 96) = .67, p = .51, η2 = .01) were observed. Planned comparisons 
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indicated that infants looked longer during the first familiarization trial (M = 15.30s, SD = 7.53s) 
than during the second (M = 8.81s, SD = 6.25s; Mean Difference = 6.49, p < .001, d = .94) and 
third familiarization trials (M = 5.92s, SD = 3.71s; Mean Difference = 9.38, p < .001, d = 1.58). 
Further, infants looked longer during the second familiarization trial than during the third 
familiarization trial (Mean Difference = 2.89, p = .01, d = .56). On average, infants in the 
incongruent group looked at the scene for 10.97s (SD = 5.35s) during the familiarization trials 
and those in the congruent group looked for 9.06s (SD = 3.37s). Infants’ overall looking during 
the three familiarization trials did not differ between the two groups (t(48) = 1.51, p = .14, d = 
.43). 
False belief. Once more, a 2 (side) X 4 (pairing) ANOVA was conducted to determine if 
the infants developed an agent/color preference during the waving pre-trial. No main effect of 
side (F(1, 50) = .51, p = .48, η2 = .01) or pairing (F(3, 50) = .42, p = .74, η2 = .02) nor an 
interaction (F(3, 50) = 1.26, p = .30, η2 = .07) were found. This indicated that there was no agent, 
color, or side preference during the waving pre-trial. A 3 (familiarization trials) X 2 (group) 
ANOVA was conducted to determine if infants’ looking during the familiarization trials differed 
across the two groups. As in the true belief condition, a significant main effect of trial was found 
(F(2, 104) = 57.40, p < .001, η2 = .53). No main effect of group (F(1, 52) = .17, p = .69, η2 = 
.003) nor an interaction (F(2, 104) = 1.48, p = .23, η2 = .03) were found. Planned comparisons 
indicated that infants looked longer during the first familiarization trial (M = 17.89s, SD = 7.56s) 
than during the second (M = 8.00s, SD = 4.01s; Mean Difference = 9.89, p < .001, d = 1.63) and 
third familiarization trials (M = 7.88s, SD = 6.67s; Mean Difference = 10.01, p < .001, d = 1.40). 
There was no difference between infants’ looking in the second and third familiarization trials 
(Mean Difference = .12, p = 1.0, d = .02). On average, infants in the incongruent group looked at 
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the scene for 11.51s (SD = 5.14s) during the familiarization trials and those in the congruent 
group looked for 11.06s (SD = 3.41s). Infants’ overall looking during the three familiarization 
trials did not differ between the two groups (t(52) = .38, p = .70, d = .10). 
Adults. Adults predicted that the agent was equally likely to reach for the yellow box (n 
= 16) than for the green box (n = 14). These predictions are not different than what would be 
expected from chance (binomial p = .86).  
Main Analyses 
 First, a 2 (condition) X 2 (group) ANOVA was conducted and revealed a main effect of 
condition  (F(1, 100) = 11.58, p = .001, η2 = .10 and a main effect of group (F(1, 100) = 16.49, p 
< .001, η2 = .14). Post-hoc analyses revealed that infants looked longer in the false belief 
condition (M = 15.47s, SD = 7.26s) than in the true belief condition (M = 11.38s, SD = 5.65s, 
t(102) = 3.18, p = .002, d = .63). Further, overall, infants in the incongruent group looked longer 
(M = 15.94s, SD = 7.36s) than those in the congruent group (M = 11.07s, SD = 5.26s, t(102) = 
3.89, p < .001, d = .76). 
Discussion 
 An issue that has been raised in the context of the infant ToM debate is the poor 
construct validity of the tasks traditionally used to assess ToM in infancy—especially false belief 
tasks (Baillargeon et al., 2018; Poulin-Dubois et al., 2018; Sabbagh & Paulus, 2018). Further, the 
VOE task has also been difficult to replicate, albeit not impossible (Burnside et al., 2019; 
Dörrenberg et al., 2018; Powell et al., 2018; Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2012; Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 
2016). However, regardless of the replicability of the tasks, the question remains: Is infants’ 
understanding of false belief as sophisticated as posited by the mentalistic view? The goal of the 
present study was to attempt to answer this question using a switch-agent paradigm and the 
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classic VOE task. We aimed to replicate Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) methodology with two 
important modifications: two agents were introduced during a pre-trial and a naïve agent 
replaced the agent with a belief at the test trial – akin to the paradigm used by Buresh and 
Woodward (2007). Given that it was important to replicate the original VOE paradigm as closely 
as possible to limit potential confounds, we designed the study to include an infant-directed 
exposure trial at the beginning of the VOE paradigm so that the only modification to the VOE 
paradigm was the naïve actress at test. We reasoned that if infants have a sophisticated 
understanding of beliefs, then they should understand that a naïve agent does not hold the same 
beliefs as the agent who acquired information about the location of an object during the 
familiarization and belief-induction trials. In other words, infants’ looking patterns should reveal 
equal looking time for both the congruent and incongruent groups (i.e., no expectations violated). 
Alternately, we would expect the incongruent group to look longer if the naïve agent is believed 
to possess the same beliefs as the knowledgeable agent (i.e., shared mental states). Results in 
both the true and false belief conditions demonstrated that infants transferred the first agent’s 
beliefs to a naïve agent that was only present during the test trial. Specifically, infants were 
surprised, and thus looked longer, when the second agent searched for the toy cup in the location 
that was inconsistent with the first agent’s beliefs. This longer looking observed in the 
incongruent group indicates that infants’ expectations of the naïve agent’s actions were violated 
as they expected her to have a true or false belief based on the knowledgeable agent’s prior 
behaviors. Interestingly, this finding replicates the looking pattern found by Onishi and 
Baillargeon (2005), who used only one agent.  
This overgeneralization of beliefs across agents challenges the mentalist view of ToM 
understanding in infancy because infants with a sophisticated understanding of beliefs should 
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conclude that the novel agent possesses no belief (true or false) about the object’s location. This 
is what adults expected when we asked them to predict where the naïve agent would search for 
the object in the FB condition. They correctly assumed that without some prior access to objects 
or events, beliefs cannot form unless through interactions with a knowledgeable agent—beliefs 
are person-specific. The developmental trajectory of this full-fledged understanding of belief 
remains to be determined. One could speculate that it coincides with the emergence of explicit 
belief reasoning during the preschool years and future research will be required to address this 
issue (Wellman et al., 2001).  Another possible pathway is that the development of a mature false 
belief concept requires a sense of self, so that the ability to metarepresent one’s own mental 
states triggers the emergence of the attribution of representations to others (Southgate, in press). 
According to this view, without cognitive self-awareness infants show an altercentric bias in that 
they orient to others’ focus of attention and encode a belief that does not belong to a specific 
individual. In other words, the content of the representation (i.e., the belief), and the agent to 
which the representation is attached, are encoded and updated separately. For example, Kovács 
and colleagues (2010) found results that indicated that “the mere presence of social agents is 
sufficient to automatically trigger online belief computations […]. Once the beliefs have been 
computed, adults and infants maintain them even in the absence of the agent, presumably for 
later use in social interactions” (page 1832). Therefore, it appears that infants’ attribution of 
beliefs is automatic, rather than reasoned.  
The present findings challenge the view that infants already possess a sophisticated, rich 
ToM and suggest that there is a gap between infants’ understanding of belief and a full-blown 
theory of mind. The present results indicate that infants overgeneralize beliefs broadly across 
agents—in other words, they might be capable of mentalizing but seem to be overattributing 
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mental states as they are applying this ability too widely (i.e. to another agent). Such 
interpretation is compatible with recent findings showing that 16-month-olds overattributed false 
belief to a toy crane that displayed only one agentive cue (i.e., goal-directed movement toward 
the boxes; Burnside et al., 2019). This single agentive cue was sufficient for infants to react to 
the toy crane as if it was an agent that could hold mental states, which implies that infants follow 
lenient, broad rules when attributing beliefs to agents. Thus, although some research has shown 
that younger infants understand that motivational mental states, such as goals (Buresh & 
Woodward, 2007) and preferences (Henderson &Woodward, 2012), are person-specific, infants 
do not seem to apply the same rule in the case of epistemic mental states, such as beliefs. Infants 
appear to attribute beliefs relatively indiscriminately and automatically. It is possible that infants 
perceive goals as person-specific “behavioral tendencies” rather than mental states (Buresh & 
Woodward, 2007). Thus, they have an easier time understanding that one individual’s behavioral 
tendency is exclusive to that individual because behaviors are observable. Mental states are 
unobservable and therefore, harder to grasp, which is likely why infants have difficulty 
understanding that beliefs are person-specific. The understanding of goals is mastered by 5–6 
months, an earlier age than belief understanding (Csibra, 2008; Király, Jovanovic, Prinz, 
Aschersleben, & Gergely, 2003; Woodward, 1998). By 9 months, infants seem to understand that 
goals are person-specific (Buresh & Woodward, 2007; Henderson & Woodward, 2012). 
However, there are mixed reviews regarding infants understanding of the binding properties of 
preferences (i.e., Kampis et al., 2013; Moore, 1999), indicating that this phenomenon might not 
be robust before the first year of life. Since belief understanding develops later, it is possible that 
16-month-olds’ understanding of this concept is rudimentary enough for them to generalize 
across agents. The present findings conflict with the prediction that the ability to bind mental 
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states to specific individuals should emerge after the first year of life, around 13–14 months 
(Kampis et al., 2013). Future research will be needed to identify the developmental trajectory of 
the critical ability to encode beliefs as person-specific.  
Importantly, both true and false belief conditions were administered in the present study. 
False belief, being the litmus test of ToM understanding, was a necessary condition to test the 
full extent of ToM sophistication at this age. Alternately, the true belief condition permitted an 
assessment of the seeing = knowing hypothesis recently brought forward by Tomasello (2018) to 
interpret infants’ behaviors in the VOE paradigm. According to this leaner mentalist view, 
infants can pass implicit false belief tasks with simple knowledge inference abilities, that is, what 
an agent sees and does not see. Tomasello (2018) argues that the concept of beliefs is not yet 
fully formed in infancy, but rather emerges when explicit ToM tasks are succeeded (see 
Wellman et al., 2001 and Wellman & Liu, 2004). Therefore, implicit false belief tasks, such as 
the one used in the present study, tap into a more rudimentary ToM ability (i.e. knowledge 
inference). Thus, if one agent sees the cup go to a location, he or she holds knowledge about the 
toy cup’s location. Infants look longer in the VOE task because their expectations of the agent’s 
knowledge state are violated. The second agent in the switch agent paradigm is said to be naïve 
because she never sees the location of the cup, and therefore should not have any knowledge 
about the location of this toy cup. Therefore, if Tomasello’s (2018) seeing = knowing theory is 
correct, then infants should not have any expectations about the second, naïve agent’s knowledge 
state. Results from the present study do not support this interpretation.  
There are, of course, alternative interpretations for the current findings. On possibility is 
that infants believed that they were in a situation of natural pedagogy so that all information they 
were shown is generalizable to all observers. By the display of ostensive cues (looking at and 
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waving at the infant) during the exposure phase, it could be argued that infants developed the 
“expectation that the content of the demonstration represents shared cultural knowledge and is 
generalizable along some relevant dimension to other objects, other occasions or other 
individuals"(Csibra & Gergely, 2011, p. 1150). Thus, they might expect that all experimenters 
have the same knowledge about the location of the object. Although we acknowledge that infants 
are biased to interpret ostensive-referential communication as conveying information that is 
generalizable, it is difficult to explain why natural pedagogy did not generate similar findings in 
the context of infants’ understanding of person-specific goals (Buresh & Woodward, 2007). A 
second account is that infants might have inferred that E1 communicated to E2 the location of 
the object. Given that among the 16 adults (out of 31) who chose the yellow box, only one 
mentioned communication of the information from E1 to E2, it is unlikely that infants could have 
made such inference. A third, simple alternative interpretation is that that infants did not detect 
the change of experimenter from familiarization to test in spite of the cues manipulated to 
maximize their distinct physical appearance and the fact that they appeared side by side during 
the exposure trial. Although we are confident that infants could tell the experimenters apart, 
future studies might add additional cues (e.g., gender) in order to ensure that the present results 
are not due to an artifact. Importantly, Apperly and Butterfill (2009) state that “[Infants] do not 
expect people to acquire beliefs about an object merely by virtue of standing on it, and they do 
not take close proximity to an object to be a necessary condition for having a belief about it; 
instead, some kind of purposive interaction with the object appears to be required (Dunham, 
Dunham, & O’Keefe, 2000; Moll & Tomasello, 2006, 2007; O’Neill, 1996)” (page 957). 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the present findings can solely be explained by natural pedagogy. 
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Taken together, the results of the present study indicate that belief understanding in infancy 
is not as sophisticated as previously believed. Rather, it appears that infants are using an 
automatic, inflexible cognitive system such that they attribute beliefs broadly to all agents and 
across agents. This is also in line with Fenici and Zawidzki’s (2017) interpretation of infants’ 
responses on implicit false belief tasks which is an elaboration of Butterfill and Apperly’s (2013) 
minimalistic theory. Specifically, they argue that the infants in Kampis and colleagues’ (2013) 
study did not recognize “enduring mental states”, which would be bound to an individual. 
Instead, they suggest that infants track relational properties of “bouts” of behaviors, which lead 
to the attribution of goals, which are “non-enduring” to individual agents. In other words, they 
argue that once a goal is detected by infants, they will behave in accordance to this goal 
indiscriminately of whom (or what; Burnside et al., 2019) the agent is. Infants are likely 
observing events in an object-centered manner, such that mental states about said objects are 
generalizable to any agent. This is a perspective that is situated at the center of the ToM debate 
spectrum, with submentalizing and the minimalist view at one end and the rich, mentalistic view 
at the other end. This is a view that concedes that infants are implicitly deducing mental states 
but are attributing these mental states broadly as the skills necessary to understand exactly whom 
should hold beliefs emerge later in childhood (e.g., executive functioning, language, and shared 
intentionality). This is also consistent with Sirois and Jackson’s (2007) view that “social 
cognition [is] an emerging (rather than innately specified) ability, rooted in joint attention” (p. 
59). In fact, joint attention has been shown to be an important precursor ability to ToM 
understanding later in childhood (Charman, Baron-Cohen, Swettenham, Baird, Drew, & Cox, 
2003; Colonnesi, Rieffe, Koops & Perucchini, 2008; Kristen, Sodian, Thoermer, & Perst, 2011). 
It appears that as infants interact with the social world, they attend to ostensive, pedagogical cues 
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exhibited by conspecifics, jointly attend to objects/events in object-centered ways. As infants 
develop, they are gradually able to use person-centered ways to process events, which facilitates 
perspective-taking such that as children build other skill sets (e.g., language, executive 
functioning) they are able to reason about other individual’s mental states (i.e., in the preschool 
years). In the meantime, infants use a more rudimentary, automatic, and broadly applicable 
belief-tracking ability, which is likely the ability captured by implicit ToM tasks. The present 
findings are in line with Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) System 1, which is efficient, quick, and 
evolutionarily useful. Infants’ limited reasoning about mental states does not yet allow them to 
understand that different humans have individual thoughts. It is still unclear how this “implicit 
ToM” develops into an explicit ToM understanding (e.g., Baillargeon et al., 2010; Scott, 2017) 
or if these abilities develop in parallel to one another (e.g., Apperly & Butterfill, 2009).  
Future research should be directed at answering this outstanding question: is “implicit” 
ToM a precursor to “explicit” ToM or do these two abilities develop in parallel? This question is 
important because it would provide insight into the developmental processes involved in socio-
cognitive development from infancy to childhood. A few longitudinal studies have started to 
answer this outstanding question. However, most longitudinal studies in this domain have 
investigated whether simple motivational mental state understanding (e.g., goal-understanding) 
predicted later ToM understanding in childhood (e.g., Aschersleben, Hover, & Jovanovic, 2008; 
Wellman, Phillips, Dunphey-Lelii, & Lalonde, 2004; Yamaguchi, Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & 
vanMarle, 2009). To our knowledge, only one study has found a relation between implicit false 
belief understanding, using an anticipatory looking task, and later false belief understanding in 
childhood (Thoermer et al., 2012). Therefore, additional conceptual longitudinal studies should 
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attempt to replicate this design using other implicit tasks to investigate whether this is a robust 
phenomenon.  
In sum, this study provides additional evidence that the rich, mentalistic view of ToM 
understanding should be toned down. Instead, it appears that infants are, in fact, attributing 
mental states to agents, but too broadly for this ability to be considered as “sophisticated” as in 
older children and adults. Such broad attribution of mental states is likely adaptive for younger 
infants, but as they develop, they gradually form more sophisticated understanding of mental 








Figure 6. Mean looking time during the test trials for both the incongruent and congruent groups 
of the true and false belief conditions.  














































The main goal of the present dissertation was to directly address the rich vs. lean debate 
about ToM understanding in infancy. According to the “rich” view, infants possess a robust and 
sophisticated false belief concept but fail explicit ToM tasks because they do not have the 
linguistic and executive functioning skills to match the task demands (Baillargeon et al., 2010; 
Scott & Baillargeon, 2017). Proponents of this view believe that there is no conceptual shift in 
the understanding of ToM established in infancy. This theory has been supported by a multitude 
of studies demonstrating that infants understand false belief (and other ToM constructs) using 
spontaneous-response, or implicit, tasks. However, replication of implicit false belief 
understanding has not always been successful. In fact, file drawer problem aside, several failed 
replications have recently been published (Poulin-Dubois et al., 2018; Sabbagh and Paulus, 
2018), adding fuel to the debate about the developmental origins of ToM. Barone, Corradi, and 
Gomila (2019) published a meta-analysis on infants’ performances on implicit false belief tasks, 
demonstrating that there is a strong likelihood of a publication bias in this field. Further, they 
demonstrated that effect size for many paradigms decreases with time—it is possible that once a 
paradigm yields positive results, replication attempts are not as successful. 
This “rich” view has been challenged by a number of “lean” views arguing that the 
implicit ToM tasks do not tap into a sophisticated ToM understanding, but a more rudimentary 
ToM system (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), or domain-general skills such as behavioral rules 
learning (Ruffman, 2014), or submentalizing (Heyes, 2014b). There is an urgent need for studies 
that could contribute to this debate by shedding light on exactly how this complex socio-
cognitive ability develops (or emerges) in humans. As such, in a series of two studies, this 
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dissertation investigated false belief understanding in infants. The first study directly tested 
Heyes’s (2014) suggestion of using an inanimate agent in an implicit task—a toy crane replaced 
the human agent in Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) VOE task—and the second study used a 
switch agent paradigm similar to Buresh and Woodward’s (2007) with the same VOE task. 
Paired together, the findings speak to the construct validity of the VOE paradigm and add crucial 
information to the ToM debate, consequently tempering the “rich” view. 
Overview of Findings 
Study 1 was designed to directly address Heyes’s (2014b) suggestion of replacing the 
human agent in implicit tasks with an inanimate object. The reasoning behind this suggestion is 
that a sophisticated ToM understanding entails attributing mental states to sentient agents only. If 
the “rich” view is correct, when all other elements of the design are unchanged (i.e., identical 
methodology), infants’ behavior should differ when an inanimate object plays the role of agent. 
Heyes’s (2014b) hypothesis is that infants do not mentalize in implicit ToM tasks, instead she 
believes that they submentalize; infants behave as if they are mentalizing, but their behavior is a 
result of low-level property processing. For example, Heyes (2014b) argues that infants in the 
incongruent group look longer during the test trial of the VOE task than those in the congruent 
group because the test trial is more perceptually different from the last salient event (i.e., 
perceptual novelty). Thus, she theorizes that infants’ looking patterns would be identical when an 
inanimate or animate agent is used. Results from Study 1 confirmed this prediction and revealed 
an identical looking pattern as reported by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005)—infants looked longer 
when the toy crane turned to the green [belief incongruent] box than when it turned to the yellow 
[belief congruent] box.  
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At first glance, these results appear to support Heyes’s (2014b) submentalizing theory. 
However, an important factor prevents such a clear-cut conclusion: the presence of animacy 
cues. In order to replicate the VOE task as closely as possible and mimic the human agent’s 
movements, the toy crane needed to display both self-propulsion and goal-directed behavior. 
Displaying goal-directed behavior is sufficient for infants to process an inanimate object such as 
a box as agentive (Adam et al., 2017; Luo & Baillargeon, 2010; Woodward, 1998), but not 
necessarily as sentient by older children (Opfer, 2002; Poulin-Dubois & Héroux, 1994). Thus, 
although submentalizing remains a possible interpretation for the current findings, it is also 
possible that infants are mentalizing, but much more broadly than are children and adults (i.e., 
overattributing mental states). In other words, infants may be attributing beliefs to any entity they 
consider agentive. If this is the case, then their understanding of beliefs—and who should hold 
them—is not as “sophisticated” as postulated by proponents of the “rich” view. In fact, even 
children aged 5 years and older (around the same age classic explicit false belief tasks are 
passed) understand that goal-directed behavior does not equate sentiency (Opfer, 2002). This 
implies that the discrimination between agency and sentiency develops in early childhood and 
that the understanding of which entities can think is involved in a sophisticated understanding of 
ToM later in development.  
Also in accordance with a “lean” view, adults in Study 1 behaved differently than did the 
infants. They predicted that the toy crane would turn to the green [belief incongruent] box. When 
asked to justify their responses, the majority of adults explained that they believed the toy crane 
would turn to the same side it turned during previous trials, indicating that they employed a 
simple behavioral rule to predict the toy crane’s actions—adults did not ascribe beliefs to a 
mechanical object. Once more, these results indicate that there is a developmental progression 
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from infancy to adulthood in the understanding of which entity can hold beliefs. Thus, despite 
the fact that the crane displayed animacy cues, the results of Study 1 support a leaner view of 
ToM understanding than the one proposed by Baillargeon and colleagues (2010), one where 
infants overattribute mental states to any entity they believe is agentive. Of note, adults 
completed an explicit version of the VOE task, which means that the variable measured is not 
identical to the one measured with infants. It is possible that this methodological difference 
explains the difference between the infant and adult findings and that older children and adults 
behave like infants when tested with a looking time paradigm. Future cross-sectional research 
should administer both an implicit and an explicit version of the VOE crane adaptation to both 
children and adults in order to determine if their explicit responses are equivalent to their implicit 
looking behavior.  
Study 2 also tested the depth of infants’ understanding of beliefs with a switch-agent 
paradigm. Specifically, the goal of this study was to determine whether infants understand that 
beliefs are person specific. In the Sally-Anne task, children aged 4 and older understand that 
although Anne has a true belief about the location of the marble, they do not generalize this 
belief to Sally—they understand that beliefs are person specific, that Sally and Anne have 
different beliefs, and that, specifically, Sally has a false belief (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). Do 
infants have the same sophisticated understanding that thoughts are person specific? Previous 
studies testing some simple ToM concepts have revealed mixed findings. Some studies 
demonstrate that infants understand that goals (Buresh & Woodward, 2007) and preferences 
(Henderson & Woodward, 2012)—both motivational states—are person specific. However, 
when a switch-agent task manipulates both preferences and beliefs, the results are not as 
conclusive. Kampis and colleagues (2013) found that infants generalized an agent’s preference, 
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which was inferred given her false belief about the presence of two objects (i.e., epistemic state), 
to a second agent who had not demonstrated a preference prior to the test trial. It is possible that 
Kampis and colleagues (2013) did not replicate Henderson and Woodward’s (2012) findings 
because this task involved the understanding of both motivational and epistemic states. Do 
infants understand that epistemic states, like motivational states, are person specific unless there 
is communication between agents?  
In Study 2, the VOE design was amended to include a switch agent manipulation. Infants 
in both the congruent and incongruent groups saw one agent in the familiarization and belief 
induction trials, and a second agent in the test trial. This second agent was deemed naïve because 
she was never exposed to the object or its location. Therefore, infants who understand that 
beliefs are person specific should not form an expectation about this naïve agent’s actions during 
the test trial (i.e., both groups should look equally during the test trial). Results revealed that the 
infants in the incongruent group looked longer during the test trial than did the infants in the 
congruent group in both the true and false belief conditions, indicating that they had formed an 
expectation that was violated when the agent reached for the green box. Infants in this study did 
not understand that, in this scenario, the first agent’s beliefs are not generalizable to others—a 
sophisticated comprehension of beliefs involves such an understanding. In a task involving 
communication between two agents, as in Tauzin and Gergely’s (2018) study, infants attribute 
beliefs to “naïve” agents following a communicative exchange. This communication permitted 
infants to assume that the location of the object was shared to the “naïve” agent, which led the 
infants to form an expectation of this “naïve” agent’s behavior. The present scenario did not 
provide any cue that there was communication between the two agents and thus infants had no 
basis on which to generalize beliefs across agents.  
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Although the false belief condition was the critical test of ToM sophistication given its 
“litmus test” status in this field, the true belief condition was particularly important in this 
design. True belief is an easier concept to grasp than false belief as it is less abstract because it is 
congruent with the observer’s belief as well as with reality (i.e., the agent’s belief about the 
location of the object is the same as the observer’s belief about the location of the object, and 
both these beliefs are true). As such, the observer—infants in this case—does not need to inhibit 
his or her own belief, that is, fewer executive functions are involved in true belief tasks 
compared to false belief tasks. Therefore, assessing the understanding of true belief specificity is 
a conservative test of the sophistication of ToM understanding. Furthermore, in the false belief 
condition of the VOE task, the agent disappears from the scene during the belief induction trial 
and then returns during the test trial, which requires more memory abilities—no such 
disappearance occurs in the true belief condition. There are several possible interpretations for 
the current findings; as in Study 1, they could either indicate that infants process the visual 
properties of the scene and respond to the perceptual novelty in the test trial (i.e., 
submentalizing), or that infants are overattributing beliefs indiscriminately to any agent present 
at test. However, as discussed in Study 2, the fact that the second agent is wearing a different 
coloured shirt and visor than the first agent also violates the association between colour, shape, 
and movement—this violation of perceptual information is present in both the incongruent and 
congruent groups. Given that a group difference was found, the overmentalizing hypothesis 
appears to be more likely than strict submentalizing. However, given that the design of the study 
was not aimed to tease these two possible interpretations apart, future research should aim to 




Main Contributions    
 The results from both studies yielded a coherent message: infants do not have a 
sophisticated understanding of beliefs to the same extent as older children and adults. Past 
research clearly demonstrates that at approximately 5 years of age, children understand that goal-
directed behavior is not sufficient for an agent to be sentient (Opfer, 2002; Poulin-Dubois & 
Héroux, 1994) and therefore understand that only certain agents, such as humans and other 
animals, have mental states, like false beliefs, that guide their behavior (Baron-Cohen et al., 
1985; Gopnik & Astington, 1988; Wellman et al., 2001). Results from this set of studies indicate 
that infants do not have this same ability. The present results are also in line with Kampis and 
colleagues’ (2013) results who found that infants overattribute mental states to novel agents 
when epistemic states are involved. Taken together, it appears that infants have a sophisticated 
understanding of motivational states, but not epistemic states. Instead, when epistemic states 
(e.g., beliefs) are involved, infants broadly attribute them to any agent indiscriminately, thus 
indicating that the “rich” view should be “toned down” to be replaced by a more developmental 
perspective. Yet, the results of the present set of studies cannot clearly parse out which lean view 
correctly explains the mechanism involved in ToM development. 
Tomasello (2018) recently brought forward a different theory about infants’ performance 
on implicit tasks. According to this view: 1) false belief is not fully developed in infancy, and 
that 2) the implicit tasks actually measure knowledge inference, not false belief (i.e., seeing = 
knowing). The results of Study 2 are also in contrast with Tomasello’s (2018) view that seeing = 
knowing is what guides infants’ behaviors in implicit tasks: the second agent never saw the 
object or its location in neither the true or false belief conditions and therefore should not have 
any “knowledge”. The true belief is a particularly stringent test of this hypothesis as the first 
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agent has true knowledge of where the object is located, but the second agent does not, yet the 
infants attributed the first agent’s true belief/knowledge to this naïve agent. Nevertheless, 
Tomasello (2018) suggested an interesting developmental theory on how explicit ToM comes to 
fruition, coined the shared intentionality account. He posits that joint attention, an early form of 
perspective triangulation, highlights the relation between two perspectives. This enables infants 
to practice recognizing when their perspective is different from someone else’s and then aligning 
their individual perspective with someone else’s perspective. Extensive practice engaging in 
perspective-taking in infancy, paired with language development in early childhood, permit 
children to have access to mental content and to practice engaging in mental content joint 
attention (i.e., having a conversation about a mutually understood topic).  
Tomasello (2018) hypothesizes that these conversations begets children to develop an 
understanding of subjective and objective perspectives, which they can then triangulate, that is, 
an understanding that their subjective perspective can be similar or different to someone else’s 
perspective and that either one of these subjective perspectives are either in line or in contrast 
with an objective perspective (i.e., facts/reality). Existing longitudinal studies provide partial 
support for this view by showing that joint attention skills in infancy predict ToM understanding 
in childhood (Charman et al., 2003; Colonnesi et al., 2008; Kristen et al., 2011). The ability to 
triangulate emerges around the age of 4 – 5 years, which explains why it is at this age that 
children can understand that the objective perspective, as well as their own subjective 
perspective, is that the marble is in the box, but that Sally’s subjective perspective is that the 
marble is in the basket. If Tomasello’s (2018) theory is true, then 16-month-olds are not yet 
proficient in understanding different individual’s perspectives. The results of the second study 
are in line with this view—infants are not able to discriminate between several subjective 
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perspectives which may explain why they overattribute epistemic states to naïve agents.  
Results of the current set of studies have important theoretical implications. Specifically, 
they permit a narrowing of the competing views that have been developed to explain ToM 
understanding in infancy. The “rich” mentalistic view needs to be revised given that there is now 
an accumulation of studies that contradict this view, including those that show the fragility of the 
concept across tasks, as well as the lack of sophistication revealed by the present studies (e.g., 
Dörrenberg et al., 2018; Heyes, 2014a; Kulke et al., 2018; Powell et al., 2018; Ruffman, 2014; 
Yott & Poulin-Dubois, 2016). However, this does not imply that the existing lean views provide 
the best interpretations. In fact, there are also studies that have yielded findings that are not in 
accordance with lean views, including that infants’ performance on false belief tasks cannot be 
fully explained by Heyes’s (2014b) low-level properties account (Song & Baillargeon, 2009), or 
Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) two-systems theory (Király, Oláh, Csibra, & Kovács, 2018). The 
present findings seem to indicate that infants overattribute mental states, but it is still unclear 
when and how overattributing evolves into the appropriate attribution of mental states.  
An amended theory that combines the present findings with Tomasello’s (2018) 
developmental theory may better explain infants’ performance on implicit tasks as well as how 
this relates to explicit ToM and its development. Accumulated evidence show that infants appear 
to be attributing beliefs, but the main question is whether or not infants are in fact tracking 
belief-like states, rudimentary mental states such as knowledge, mere behaviors, or low-level 
properties. As previously mentioned, there exists evidence for and against many of these 
theories, which were all brought forward to explain the observed findings, thus lending some 
merit to each of these theories. However, given that there also exists evidence against these 
theories, they might not accurately explain the developmental trajectory of ToM from infancy to 
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childhood. As such, we propose an integrative theory that explains infants’ varied performances 
on various implicit tasks in relation to ToM development. Assuming that ToM is not innate, but 
rather develops in early childhood, this human capacity develops to facilitate social interactions 
(e.g., understanding one’s peers’ perspectives and mental states helps one better predict their 
peers’ behaviors). ToM likely develops very similarly to how Tomasello (2018) suggests—given 
that human infants are innately social, they attend to social information in their environment and 
consequently learn to engage in joint attention with other humans. This practicing of perspective-
taking in infancy very likely paves the way for a comprehensive understanding of perspectives 
later-on in childhood. However, as the present findings does not support Tomasello’s (2018) 
theory that implicit false belief tasks measure knowledge inference (seeing = knowing), we 
propose that these tasks are likely tapping into a System 1-like form of perspective-taking.  
Given that infants are able to engage in joint attention as of 9 months, by the time they 
“succeed” on implicit false belief tasks (15 – 16 months), they are presumably able to engage in 
perspective-taking (i.e., they know what the agent saw and did not see) (Moll, Carpenter, & 
Tomasello, 2007; Moll & Tomasello, 2006). This ability is likely automatic, akin to the two-
system’s System 1. Infants thus form implicit expectations of how an agent would behave with a 
given perspective, and because this ability is automatic (i.e., not reasoned), it is likely applied to 
any agent that could have the same perspective. For example, in the VOE false belief task, 
infants see an agent display a clear goal: to find the object. According to this agent’s perspective 
(or engagement as Wellman (2014) calls it), and the agent’s goal to obtain the object, the agent 
should reach in the yellow box. Rather than reasoning about another individual’s mental states 
(i.e., mentalizing as stipulated by the “rich” view), infants are engaging in perspective-taking 
(e.g., if I wanted to grab the object and I did not see it go back to the green box, then I would 
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reach in the yellow box). Therefore, we posit that infants are aware of agents’ perspectives and, 
as the present evidence suggests, overattribute perspectives to any agent in the scene. With 
accumulated practice engaging in perspective-taking, language development, engaging in mental 
content perspective-taking, and learning how to triangulate, children eventually learn to reason 
about others’ beliefs—around 4 – 5 years of age. If this theory is true, then it is possible that the 
various implicit false belief tasks yield mixed results (i.e., numerous non-replications) because 
they are designed to measure a construct that is not fully developed in infancy.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
 One limitation of the results from the current set of studies is that is does not provide 
direct evidence for which lean view correctly accounts for the findings yielded by implicit false 
belief tasks (e.g., submentalizing vs. behavioral rules vs. two-systems vs. seeing = knowing). 
Instead, it permitted an investigation of whether infants’ performance on the VOE task reflects a 
sophisticated false belief understanding, thus pitting the “rich” and “lean” views against each 
other. Future studies should attempt to determine which “lean” view accounts for the majority of 
findings. For example, replicating the VOE task with opaque and transparent visors, similar to 
Senju, Southgate, Snape, Leonard, and Csibra’s (2011) paradigm, would directly test if the 
submentalizing account explains infants’ performance on the VOE task. Prior to the VOE task, 
infants would be given the opportunity to inspect and engage with the visor (either opaque or 
transparent) so that they would know if the agent can see through it or not. According to the 
submentalizing hypothesis, the infants look longer when they view the green [belief incongruent] 
box event because this event is more perceptually novel than the last event that occurred when 
the agent was present—in the belief induction trial, a yellow box–agent association is made 
because the last time the agent was present, the object was paired with the yellow box. This 
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association is broken in the green [belief incongruent] box event, yielding longer looking 
durations. However, this theory stands only if the agent is absent during the movement of the 
object back to the green box. Therefore, the visor paradigm would permit the agent to remain in 
the scene while inducing a true (transparent visor) or false (opaque visor) belief. If infants are 
genuinely processing the agent’s belief/perspective/knowledge, then the infants in the opaque 
visor condition should look longer when the agent reaches in the green box because she could 
not see the toy return to the green box, while the infants in the transparent visor condition should 
look longer if the agent reaches in the yellow box because she saw the object return to the green 
box. However, if infants are submentalizing, then the green box–agent association is made 
because the last time the agent was present, the object was paired with the green box (as she 
never leaves the scene). Therefore, infants in both the transparent and opaque conditions should 
look longer when they view the yellow [belief congruent] box event because it breaks the green 
box–agent association that was made and is therefore more perceptually novel. Therefore, if a 
main effect of condition is found, then the submentalizing hypothesis does not accurately explain 
infants’ performance on the VOE task, thus ruling out one of the “lean” views. If no such main 
effect is observed, then infants submentalize and their performance on the VOE task does not 
reflect mentalizing abilities.  
 Another limitation of the current study is that it does not directly compare infants’ and 
children’s ToM understanding. Longitudinal studies would permit this comparison and would 
investigate the developmental trajectory of ToM development in the same individuals—how 
does overattributing mental states to any agent evolve into the appropriate attribution of mental 
states to sentient beings?  For example, Tomasello’s (2018) theory about how ToM precursors 
(e.g., knowledge inference) develops into explicit ToM understanding could be investigated in 
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the same individuals from infancy to 5 years of age. According to Tomasello’s (2018) shared 
intentionality account, joint attention as well as knowledge inference are precursor abilities to 
explicit ToM and therefore, infants’ performance on knowledge inference tasks should predict 
their performance on explicit tasks (e.g., Wellman and Liu (2004) ToM scale) in childhood. 
Importantly, children’s verbal abilities should also be measured given that the shared 
intentionality account stipulates that communication is one of the mechanisms underlying the 
development of mental content perspective-taking, and thus the discrimination between 
subjective and objective perspectives. This theory is best investigated within individuals as the 
shared intentionality account is a developmental theory. As such, a longitudinal study would be 
the best design to directly test Tomasello’s (2018) theory.  
 Future research should also focus on determining which implicit tasks more reliably 
measure belief-like states. A large-scale multi-laboratory replication study (ManyBabies2) was 
recently designed to gather data on three “implicit false belief” tasks: anticipatory looking, VOE, 
and interactive (Frank et al., 2018). The goal is to determine whether the three selected tasks can 
be replicated and therefore determine whether they measure the intended construct. However, 
such efforts should be made to determine which construct is actually present in infancy (e.g., 
beliefs, belief-like states, perspective-taking, knowledge inference, etc.) and then efforts should 
be made to establish reliable tasks that measure said construct in order to accurately determine 
the developmental progression of ToM in early childhood.  
Having a comprehensive understanding of ToM development in early childhood also 
entails important clinical implications. Specifically, ToM impairments are an important aspect of 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Burnside, Wright, & Poulin-
Dubois, 2017). In fact, (explicit) ToM training is frequently used in interventions (Begeer, 
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Gevers, Clifford, Verhoeve, Kat, Hoddenbach, & Boer, 2011; Gevers, Clifford, Mager, & Boer, 
2006; Fisher, & Happé, 2005). Thus, a comprehensive understanding of the precursors to an 
explicit ToM understanding could lead to earlier diagnosis as well as earlier treatment 
interventions for individuals with ToM impairments.  
Conclusion  
 To conclude, the goal of the present set of studies was to determine whether infants 
have a sophisticated false belief understanding when measured using the VOE task developed by 
Onishi and Baillargeon (2005). This task was chosen because it was the first to report false belief 
attribution in infants and has frequently been used in studies (but not always replicated) despite 
the fact that its construct validity was not established. Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) study is 
also frequently cited as a milestone study that has revealed that infants have a sophisticated ToM 
understanding—such a claim should be investigated more closely before it is treated as a fact. 
The present results revealed that 16-month-old infants overattribute “beliefs” inappropriately—to 
a toy crane and to a naïve agent; if infants’ understanding was indeed sophisticated, both of these 
agents should be denied such “beliefs”. As such, the results suggest that the “rich” mentalistic 
view needs to be revised and that a leaner view is likely more accurate regarding ToM 
development. However, it remains to be confirmed which “lean” view is correct. Future research 
should continue investigating which construct is actually being measured by these implicit tasks, 
as well as which implicit tasks are more reliable. This is important to establish because tasks that 
do not yield robust findings prevent conclusive interpretations.  
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Appendix A: Recruitment materials 
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Appendix B: Consent forms  
English Consent form – Study 1 
French Consent form – Study 1 
English Consent form – Study 2 










































Appendix C: Demographics Questionnaire 
English Demographics Questionnaire – Study 1 
French Demographics Questionnaire – Study 1 
English Demographics Questionnaire – Study 2 
French Demographics Questionnaire – Study 2 
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